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THE PUBLICADVOCATE FOR NEW YORK CITY

I don't know if there's another city in America that has an elected
public advocate. But think about what that means. What would
it mean for you to be a public advocate? Someone who is standing
up for people at large, right? For the public ....I'm sort of the
country's public advocate.
-President William Jefferson Clinton'
INTRODUCTION

On January 2, 1994, Mark Green was sworn in as the first public
advocate for New York City, a citywide elected position that is more than
a century-and-a-half old. The holder of this office, formerly known as the
"President of the City Council,", 2 historically presided over the New York
City Legislature, represented citywide rather than borough or local interests
in the City's governing bodies, and served as a counterweight to the
powerful mayor. In response to the political upheavals of the 1960s, the
council president in 1975 also became New York City's official
"ombudsman"-responsible for addressing citizen complaints about
government waste and abuse. When the new City Charter was adopted in
1989, the office's ombudsman powers were expanded significantly to
include a mandate to identify and address systemic problems in City
agencies. 3
While there are many kinds of government and private ombudsman
offices, 4 the Office of the Public Advocate is unique. A quirk in New York
City's history has made it the only elected ombudsman in the world. 5 All

1. President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks on Kick Butts Day in Brooklyn, New
York, 33 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 521 (Apr. 15, 1997), available in LEXIS, News

Library, Presidential Documents File.
2. The name was changed to public advocate. See NEW YORK, N.Y., Loc. L. No.
19 and Loc. L. No. 68 (1993). For clarity, we refer to the position by the name it was
given during each of the time periods discussed.
3. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 24 (1989).
4. See infra note 108 (list of general governmental ombudsmen).
5. This conclusion is based on a review of the known United States ombudsman
offices, a survey of the members of the United States Ombudsman Association and the
International Association of Ombudsmen, and correspondence with the leadership of
ombudsman organizations and prominent scholars of ombudsmanship. See Letter from
Stanley Anderson, Professor Emeritus, University of California, Santa Barbara, to Laurel
W. Eisner, General Counsel for the Public Advocate (Jan. 7, 1997) (stating that he
"know[s] of no other directly elected Ombuds [sic]"); Letter from Donald C. Rowat,
Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, to Laurel W.
Eisner, General Counsel for the Public Advocate (Jan. 10, 1997) ("I have not heard of any
ombudsman office in the world that is directly elected [ ]other than governors or lieutenant
governors ... I know of no literature that discusses the idea of an elected ombudsman.
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the others are appointed by-and thus dependent on-the executive or the
legislature. The public advocate is the only popularly elected government
official whose primary role is to be an ombudsman.
The elective nature of the office also makes the public advocate a
player in the City's partisan political fray. That, along with the office's

unusual structure, its mandate to function as a critic-at-large, and its lack

of line responsibility, 7 has made the position the target of periodic
proposals to eliminate or radically restructure it. The elective nature of the
position has also protected it, however, by insulating it from critics and
enabling the office holder to function independently of the sectors of
government he or she is mandated to oversee. This independence permits
the City's ombudsman to be responsive to the concerns and complaints of
otherwise powerless communities and sub-groups in this multiracial,
multiethnic, and economically heterogeneous city. The citywide election
of the public advocate grants the office a popular mandate that City
bureaucrats, other elected officials, and the media cannot easily ignore.
The public advocate's work, in fact, has been of significant interest to
the press and the public and has led whistle blowers, advocacy groups, and
concerned citizens to seek the office's intervention.' During Mark Green's

The classical office is always assumed to be an agency of the legislature to monitor the
administration."); Letter from Bernard Frank, American Friends of The International
Ombudsman Institute, to Laurel W. Eisner, General Counsel for the Public Advocate (Jan.
16, 1997) ("I know of no other state or municipal Ombudsmen in the United States elected
to office by popular vote. I doubt there are any such elsewhere in the world. Therefore,
the New York City Public Advocate is unique in that respect.") [hereinafter Letter from
Bernard Frank].
6. The handful of lieutenant governors who have taken on some ombudsman role are
not elected as ombudsmen but rather as second-in-command to the chief executive. The
ombudsman role is secondary-at best-and largely discretionary rather than statutory. In
New York, in 1979, Governor Carey designated Lieutenant Governor Mario Cuomo to
serve as the state's ombudsman. See Mario Cuomo, Editorial, New York Needs an Elected
Ombudsman, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1981, at A22. The states of Colorado, Illinois, South
Carolina, and New Mexico also established ombudsman functions in the lieutenant
governors' offices in the 1970s. See Alan J. Wyner, Lieutenant Governors as Political
Ombudsmen, in EXECUTIVE OMBUDSMEN INTHE UNITED STATES 135 (Alan J. Wyner ed.,
1973) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE OMBUDSMEN INTHE UNITED STATES].
7. Like classic ombudsmen, the public advocate is mandated to handle complaints and
identify systemic problems but has no authority to overrule executive decisions or
implement proposed recommendations. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 24 passim (1989,
as amended through 1997).
8. Unfortunately, the requests sometimes exceed the office's limited resources, which
consisted, between 1994 and 1998, of only 45 staff members and a budget of $2.3 million,
which is nearly 40% lower than the budget of the office during the Dinins administration.
Compare CITY OF NEW YORK, OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, MESSAGE OF THE MAYOR: THE CITY
OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 1997, at 234, with CITY OF NEW YORK,
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first four and one-half years as public advocate, his office received nearly
80,000 complaints from the public and a steady stream of requests for the
115 investigative reports, budget analyses, and consumer guides issued by
the office. 9 Two of Green's predecessors in the office-Andrew Stein and
Carol Bellamy-also handled large numbers of individual complaints and
issued reports about system-wide problems.'"
Many of the investigative reports have provoked considerable
controversy, as well as the enmity of the targeted entities, and the mayoral
agencies have largely refused to cooperate with the office's
investigations-particularly during Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's
administration.
This article chronicles the historical evolution of the Office of City
Council President/Public Advocate over the past 100 years-focusing on
the events that led to the establishment of the office as a citywide elected
ombudsman. It then summarizes the debates about the office during the
1989 New York City Charter revision proceedings and describes the
office's powers under the resulting Charter and how they have been
implemented during Mark Green's tenure. Finally, the article analyzes the
position's strengths and weaknesses and proposes some changes to the
Charter to clarify the position's powers and increase its effectiveness in
future administrations.

OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, MESSAGE OF THE MAYOR: THE CITY OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE

BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 1993, at 266.

9. Between January 1994 and June 1998, for example, the Public Advocate's Office
(a) issued more than 100 investigative reports, (b) wrote dozens of analyses of the City's
budget and letters to government officials identifying problems or recommending policy
changes, (c) initiated and introduced, as prime sponsor, legislation in the City Council
(including bills to overhaul New York City's commercial carting industry, to reform the
City's campaign finance system, to make the Department of Investigation more independent
of the mayor, to strengthen the City's laws for protecting whistle blowers, and to ban
workplace discrimination against victims of domestic violence), (d) published several
comprehensive consumer guides to health maintenance organizations and hospitals and a
detailed research study of New York City's uninsured population, and (e) created a
specialized ombudsman unit for individuals and families who deal with the City's child
welfare system. The reports are on file at the Municipal Reference and Research Center
Library located at 31 Chambers Street, New York, New York (hereinafter the "Municipal
Reference Library"). A partial list and description of some of these publications is
contained in ifta notes 224-51, 255.
10. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
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THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE OFFICE

FROM 1831 TO 1989
A. 1831 to 1975: The City Council President,
the Mayoralty, and Borough Politics
The Office of Public Advocate dates back to 1831, long before the
unification of the five boroughs into a single city.
It began as the
president of the Board of Aldermen, a legislative body of the borough of
New York and a portion of the Bronx, who was first-in-line of succession
to the mayor under the 1830 City Charter." The survival of the office in
various forms for over a century and a half is a testament to the deep-seated
resistance by the City's political leadership and voters to placing excessive,
or unchecked, power in either the mayor or the borough officials.
In 1898, the five boroughs were consolidated into one City, but power
in the new unified entity was dispersed among numerous officials.' The
president of the Board of Aldermen was designated to sit with the mayor
and other citywide officials on the Board of Estimate and Apportionment,
a separate entity which managed the City's budget."' In 1901, the City
Charter was revised to weaken the new mayoralty's powers. The amended
Charter strengthened the Board of Estimate and Apportionment and added
the borough presidents as members, thus institutionalizing the pattern of
governance that continues in modified form to this day. It provided some
electoral representation to each of the boroughs but offset the centrifugal
force of borough interests by vesting the balance of power14in three citywide
elected officials, who also checked each others' powers.

11. See REBECCA B. RANKIN, MONOGRAPH, HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF ALDERMEN OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1920). The City

Council replaced the Board of Aldermen in 1938.
Annotation, N.Y. CITY CHARTER, at 27 (1937).

12.

See Laurence Arnold Tanzer,

See 1896 N.Y. Laws 488; see also 1897 N.Y. Laws 378; The Reemergence of

Municipal Reform, in RESTRUCTURING THE NEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT: THE

REEMERGENCE OF MUNICIPAL REFORM 1 (Gerald Benjamin & Frank J. Mauro eds., 1989).
See generally WALLACE S. SAYRE & HERBERT KAUFMAN, GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY:

POLITICS INTHE METROPOLIS 13-17 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1965) (1960); R. Alta Charo,
Designing MathematicalModels to DescribeOne-Person, One-Vote Compliance by Unique
Governmental Structures: The Case of the New York City Board of Estimate, 53 FORDHAM
L. REV. 735, 742 (1985); Joseph P. Viteritti, The New Charter:Will it Make a Difference?
in URBAN POLITICS, NEW YORK STYLE 413-28 (Jewel Bellush & Dick Netzer eds., 1990).
13. The other members were the corporation counsel, the president of the Department
of Taxes and Assessment, and the comptroller. See R. Alta Charo, supra note 12, at 74243.
14. See id.; see also Viteritti, supra note 12, at 415-16.
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Between 1901 and 1989, the City Charter was revised four more
times, 15 and each time, the position that ultimately became the public
advocate was retained as first in line of succession to the mayor and as an
integral part of the governing structure. With each revision, various
powers over budget, legislation, and land use were redesigned and
reallocated, but the basic outlines of power remained constant. The
increasingly important mayoralty was balanced by at least two other
citywide elected officials, including the presiding officer of the legislature
and five chief borough officers. Each Charter revision, including the latest
in 1989, represented a compromise between competing visions of good
government for the growing and unwieldy metropolis, that is, between
centralizing City government and ensuring sufficient borough
representation and other checks on mayoral power.' 6
In 1936, a new Charter replaced the Board of Aldermen with a City
Council as the sole legislative body of the City of New York. The
president of the Board of Aldermen became the city council president. 7
The council president remained first in line of succession to the mayor in
the event of a vacancy, disability, or other absence from office.' 8 The
Charter modified the powers to be more akin to the role of the vice
president in the United States Senate. The council president presided over
the City Council and could participate in the discussions but only voted in
the case of a tie.' 9
The 1936 Charter once again placed significant power in three citywide
elected officials-the mayor, the comptroller, and the president of the
Council, each of whom remained on the newly renamed Board of Estimate.
Each citywide official cast three votes in that chamber: the Manhattan and
Brooklyn borough presidents were entitled to two votes each, while the
borough presidents of the Bronx, Queens, and Staten Island cast only one
apiece.20 Council members were elected for two years, 2' while the citywide
officials, including the council president, served for four. 2

15. See Gerald Benjamin, Charter,in THEENCYCLOPEDIA OFNEWYORK CITY 202-08
(Kenneth T. Jackson ed., Yale Univ. Press 1995) (stating that the City Charter was actually
changed 14 times during this time period, however, in only 1936, 1961, 1975, and 1989
were the changes made by referendum or by proposals from a charter revision commission).
16. See generally R. Alta Charo, supra note 12, at 742-43 (describing changes to the
structure of the Board of Estimate, including the five borough presidents).
17. See Tanzer, supra note 11, at 28. See generally List of Presidents of the Board
of Aldermen (1831-1937) and Presidents of the City Council (1937-1975) (on file in the
Municipal Reference Library archives).
18. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 1 §§ 10(a)(1), (2) (1936).
19. See id. ch. 2 § 29.
20. See id. ch. 3 § 62(a).
21. See id. ch. 2 § 24.
22. See id. ch. 1§3, ch. 2§23(a).
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In the 1961 revised Charter, the council president continued to preside
over the City Council and to be next-in-line to the mayor.' The three
citywide elected officials, including the council president, continued on the
Board of Estimate with equal voting power 24 and remained as trustees of
the New York City Employees' Retirement System. 25
B. The 1975 CharterRevision-the Debate over the Council Presidency

The City Charter was revised once again during the fiscal crisis of the
mid-1970s which nearly brought the City to bankruptcy. In 1972, the New
York State Legislature established a commission,26 chaired by State Senator
Roy M. Goodman,2 7 to study the City Charter and propose reforms. In an
effort to find an appropriate role for the Office of the City Council
President, the Commission contracted with the Urban Analysis Center at
the City University of New York ("the Center") to study that office. The
Center issued a report2 8 which noted the office's limitations-no
administrative authority over City services, no access to the mayor's inner
circle, and restricted influence in the Council -but concluded that it served
an important function as a citywide "critic at large. "29

23. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 §§ 10(b), 23(d) (1961).
24. Their votes, respectively, were increased from three to four. Each of the five
borough presidents was given two votes. See id. ch. 3 § 62(a).
25. The City Retirement System created in 1920 designated the members of the Board
of Estimate and Apportionment as the trustees of the system. See 1920 N.Y. Laws 427 §
1706. An independent Board of Trustees, including the council president, was established
by state law in 1969. See 1969 N.Y. Laws 866.
26. See 1972 N.Y. Laws 634. This law created the Temporary State Commission on
the Revision of the New York City Charter.
27. The Commission members in 1975 were Edward N. Costikyan (attorney and vice
chairman), Richard Aurelio (former deputy mayor), Albert H. Blumenthal (Assembly
majority leader), Charles Carreras (attorney), Albert V. Maniscalco (former Staten Island
borough president), Maurice J.McCarthy, Jr. (former chair of the City Council Finance
Committee), Robert J. Milano (industrialist), Basil A. Paterson (former state senator), Zelia
P. Ruebhausen (former board member of the League of Women Voters), and Leonard P.
Stavisky (chair of the Assembly Committee on Education). An additional member, General
Lucius D. Clay, resigned in 1973 and was replaced by John F. Haggerty (counsel to the
Senate majority leader). See URBAN ANALYSIS CTR., CITY UNIV. N.Y., THE CITY COUNCIL
OF NEW YORK AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE CITY COUNCIL (1973) [hereinafter URBAN
ANALYSIS CTR.
REPORT]; STATE CHARTER REvIsION COMM'N FOR N.Y. CITY,
RECOMMENDATIONS: CITY COUNCIL BOARD OF ESTIMATE (Apr. 10, 1975) [hereinafter
CITY COUNCIL RECOMMENDATIONS].
28. See URBAN ANALYSIS CTR. REPORT, supra note 27,

29.

Id. at 15.

at 13, 15.
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[T]he ability of an incumbent Council President to influence city
policy depends less on the formal powers deriving from the
charter, and more from his personality, his ability to anticipate
issues and to articulate them in the news media, and to use adroitly
his Board of Estimate membership and available staff resources.30
[It is] important also to have within the top echelons of the
government the potential, if not the reality, of a critic-at-large of
executive bureaucracy and performance, whether at the central
city, borough, or local level.3'
Within the government, there are few city-wide foci of criticism
to counterbalance the executive branch .

. .

. This supports the

case for a critical "presence" with a city-wide perspective,
removed from the daily
chore of producing the goods and services
32
of the government.
Several of the commissioners were unpersuaded. In April 1975, the
Commission issued a preliminary report which proposed eliminating the
city council presidency, making the speaker the presiding officer of the
Council, and creating a vice mayor who would be elected independently of
the mayor and serve as chair of the Board of Estimate.
The vice
chairman of the Council would be eliminated as well, to be replaced by the
speaker.34 Four commissioners, however, proposed a novel alternative:
Perhaps the President of the City Council should be given some
additional responsibilities. Conceivably the President of the
Council should be vested with the functions of an ombudsman,
since he is elected City-wide and does not exercise line
responsibility. Perhaps he should be Chairman of the City's
citizen information and complaint service, where he could rely
upon an existing network of district City Council members and
30. Id. at 8.
31. Id. at 9.
32. Id. at 12-13. The Center also discussed the importance of the position as a vehicle
for insuring representation of diverse populations-a hot button issue again in 1989. See
id. at 15.
33. See CITY COUNCIL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 27, at 34-36.
34. See id. The Commission stressed the importance of a third citywide elected
position to "provide[ ] balance between the Comptroller and the Mayor, traditional rivals,
and also contribute[ ] a City-wide perspective unencumbered by the administrative
constraints of the two other City-wide officials and the five Borough Presidents." Id.

at 9.
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Community Boards to be his officers in the field. Unfortunately,
such options have not even been discussed in the reports.35
This latter view ultimately prevailed in modified form.
The
Commission's final report, issued four months later, retained the Office of
City Council President but tied it to the mayor by requiring the mayor and
council president to be "chosen jointly by the casting by each elector of a
single vote applicable to both offices. 36 However, for the first time since
the office was created in 1831, the Commission also proposed the addition
of a new, quasi-ombudsman role for the city council president.37
In addition to his other duties and responsibilities, the president of
the council shall (1) oversee the coordination of city-wide citizen
information and service complaint programs, and (2) review
complaints of a recurring and multi-borough or city-wide nature
relating to services and programs, and make proposals to improve
the city's response to and processing of such complaints.3 8
The Commission did not use the word "ombudsman," as the four
dissenters had suggested, 39 and by linking the council presidency to the
mayoralty, it apparently did not envision an independent overseer of
executive agencies.
Rather, the Commission intended "to make
information about the City government readily available to the public and
to secure prompt attention to all complaints" by creating an "information
and complaint network in the City's service agencies with the aim of

35. Id. at 40 (statements from Charles J. Carreras, Albert V.Maniscalco, Maurice J.
McCarthy, Jr., and Leonard P. Stavisky, entitled Concurring and Additional Views of
Commissioners)(emphasis added). The debates among the commissioners also reflected the
historic disagreements over the extent to which power should be centralized. Commissioner
Costikyan urged strengthening the Board of Estimate as a "balance wheel" between the
central government and the locals districts. See id. at 33 (statements from Edward N.
Costikyan, entitled Additional Views of Vice-Chairman Edward N. Costikyan) (emphasis
added). Commissioner Ruebhausen argued that the Board was an anachronism and should
be abolished. See id. at 43 (statements from Zelia P. Ruebhausen, entitled Dissent of
CommissionerZelia P. Ruebhausen).
36.

STATE CHARTER REVISION COMM'N FOR N.Y. CITY, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO

THE CHARTER FOR THE CITY OF N.Y. at 12 (Aug. 5,
AMENDMENTS]; see also Maurice Carroll, Symmetry

1975) [hereinafter 1975 PROPOSED
Is One of the Goals of the Charter

Revision, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1975, at 40.
37. See 1975 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 36, at 13.
38. N. Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 23(e) (1976, as amended through 1977).

39. The Urban Analysis Center study had discussed the city council president as "a
sort of Ombudsman for the city as a whole," but made no such recommendation in its
report. See URBAN ANALYSIS CTR. REPORT, supra note 27, at 13.
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directing the attention of responsible authorities to the complaint and
getting back word to the complainant within a reasonable time as to what
is being done about it.'I
The Commission's proposals for revision of the Charter were submitted
to the electorate on November 4, 1975. The ballot contained ten separate
propositions, each to be voted up or down on its own merits. The
Commission unanimously recommended the first six, but, due to
differences of opinion among the members, took no position on the final
four, including the proposal to link the election of the mayor and the
council president.4'
The voters defeated the proposition linking the mayor and council
president but approved the enhancement of the council president's position
by adding an information and complaint oversight role.42 Under the
resulting Charter, in 1977, the city council president remained completely
independent of the mayor, remained the presiding officer of the Council,
retained the four votes on the Board of Estimate, and gained the newalbeit narrowly defined-role concerning citizen complaints. The addition
of the new responsibilities, despite the very constrained Charter language,
transformed the office and set the stage for its current incarnation as a fullfledged ombudsman.
C. The Council President, the Battles of the 1960s,
and "Ombudsmania"
In 1989, when the subsequent Charter Revision Commission was
debating what to do with the city council president's position once the
Board of Estimate was eliminated,43 only the incumbent, Andrew Stein,
cited the tens of thousands of citizen complaints received by his office as
a primary-indeed sufficient-reason for retaining the office. 44 Everyone
took this public service for granted. But during the 1960s and 1970s, the
proposal to create an ombudsman for New York City with the authority to

40. STATE CHARTER REVISION COMM'N FOR N.Y. CITY, A MORE EFFICIENT AND
RESPONSIVE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: FINAL REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 14 (Mar.
31, 1977).
41. See STATE CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, THIS NOVEMBER 4, THE MOST
IMPORTANT CANDIDATE ISN'T A POLITICIAN: IT'S A PIECE OF PAPER (1975) (informational
flier for voters highlighting proposed changes in the City Charter).
42. See Frank Lynn, City Vote Apparently Bars 4 Amendments to Charter, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 1975 at, Al.

43. See discussion infra Part II.
44. See Charter Revision Hearings Before the New York City Charter Revision
Commission, 202 (Apr. 6, 1989) (testimony of Andrew Stein) [hereinafter "Stein
Testimony"].
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hear and resolve citizen complaints was surprisingly controversial." 5 The
idea was widely touted but only reluctantly implemented.
1. The Swedish Concept of Ombudsman in the United States
"Ombudsman," the Swedish word for intermediary or "go-between,"
is an idea that originated in Sweden in the early 1700s. Originally
appointed by the king to oversee his ministers and other officials, by the
1800s the Swedish Ombudsman had evolved into an administrative body
appointed by the Parliament to protect individuals against the excesses of
the bureaucracy. 6
47
The idea spread to other parts of Scandinavia and to Europe and Asia
but did not catch on in the United States until the 1960s, apparently in
response to the social and political turmoil of that decade. The movements
to empower ordinary citizens 48 (especially poor people and minorities), the
political reform movements, and the profound racial conflicts around the
country 49 provoked mainstream media and political leaders to propose
citizen grievance offices-or ombudsmen-as a mechanism for defusing
public anger at government.
The idea of an ombudsman as a solution to political discontent and

bureaucratic abuses became, for a period of approximately twenty years,

45. To this day some legislators continue to be hostile to the idea of their constituents
turning to a citywide elected official for help with problems.'The legislators are correct to
note that constituent service is an important building block of political power. See David R.
Eichenthal, The OtherElected Officials, in URBAN POLITICS: NEW YORK STYLE, supra note
12, at 86, 98-100.
46.

UNITED STATES OMBUDSMANASSOCIATION, PUBLICSECTOR OMBUDSMAN (1997)

(information brochure); see also Douglas Ivor Brandon et. al., Self-Help: Extrajudicial
Rights, Privileges & Remedies in Contemporary American Society, 37 VAND. L. REV.
1031 (1984). The Swedish ombudsman's office continues to this day.
47. See generally THE OMBUDSMAN: CITIZEN'S DEFENDER 7 (Donald C. Rowat ed.,
2d ed. 1968) (citing numerous ombudsman offices throughout the world); see also Donald
C. Rowat, The Spread of the Ombudsman Idea, in OMBUDSMAN FOR AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT? THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY (Stanley V. Anderson ed., 1968).
48. See, e.g., Richard A. Cloward & Richard M. Elman, Poverty, Injustice and the
Welfare State, in EHRENSAFT & ETzIONI, ANATOMIES OF AMERICA, SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 133-35 (1969) (discussing the idea of an ombudsman for poor people);
Rowat, supra note 47, at 7.
49. See WILLIAM GWYN, BARRIERSTOESTABLISHINGURBAN OMBUDSMEN: THECASE
OF NEWARK 1 (1974); see also Eugene Garaventa, Urban Ombudsman BarriersDetailed,
NAT'L CIVIC REV., Dec. 1974, at 603-04.
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the subject of much debate-part of the wave of "ombudsmania"5 ° that
swept the United States. This is reflected in hundreds of articles in
academic and legal journals and dozens of federal, state, and local
legislative initiatives during that period.5 1 Most proponents of the idea
envisioned a non-partisan, appointed officer of the executive branch or the
legislature who would handle complaints of administrative injustice and be
empowered to investigate, criticize, and publicize, but not to reverse or
implement, an administrative action. That is the classic definition of
ombudsman, based on the Swedish model,52 but it differs considerably from
the version ultimately established in New York City.
In theory, because the classic ombudsman has neither a partisan
position nor elective ambitions, he or she is non-threatening to other
government officials. In practice, however, at least in the United States,
there was strong resistance to creating even such "non-political"
ombudsmen. Many efforts to establish ombudsmen offices failed or were
short-lived during that period.53 Legislators and executives alike agreed in
principle that grievances should be addressed, but they objected to the
creation of a new and independent locus of power-even if its only function
was to serve as a forum for citizen complaints. Executives predictably
opposed creating an institution that could highlight bureaucratic abuses, and

50. The term "ombudsmania" was coined by Donald Rowat, one of the key writers
in the field during the 1960s. See Rowat, supra note 47; see also Paul Verkuil, The
Ombudsman and the Limits of the Adversary System, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 845 (1975).

51.

In addition to those cited so far, see, e.g., H.R. 6265, 89th Cong. (1965);

STANLEY V. ANDERSON, OMBUDSMAN PAPERS: AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AND PROPOSALS

(1969);

WALTER GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS: CITIZENS' PROTECTORS IN NINE
(1966); WALTER GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN: GOVERNMENTAL

COUNTRIES

PROCEDURES (1966); Stanley Anderson, Ombudsman Research: A
BibliographicEssay, 2 OMBUDSMAN J. 33 (1982); Alan J. Wyner, ComplaintResolution
in Nebraska: Citizens, Bureaucratsand the Ombudsman, 54 NEB. L. REV. 1 (1975); SAM
GRIEVANCE

ZAGORIA, THE OMBUDSMAN:

How GOOD GOVERNMENTS

HANDLE CITIZENS' GRIEVANCES

(1988); Bernard Frank, State Ombudsman Legislation in the United States, 29 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 397 (1975); William B. Gwyn, Justice and the Ombudsman, 15 TUL. STUD. IN
POL. SCI. 95; Robert D. Miewald & John C. Comer, Complaining as Participation:The
Case of the Ombudsman, 17 ADMIN. & SOc. 481 (1986); Terry L. Rosen, Office of Citizen
Response: The Denver Experience, 37 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 528 (1977); A State Statute to
Create the Office of Ombudsman, 2 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 213 (1965).
52. See Verkuil, supra note 50, at 847.
53. See, e.g., GWYN, supra note 49; Bernard Frank, The Ombudsman Concept Is
Expanding in the U.S., 61 NAT'L CIVIC REV. 235 (1972) (discussing a short-lived
experimental project in Buffalo).
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legislators were fearful of a competitor for the attention of their
constituents .4
2. New York's Ombudsman Battles
In New York, bills were introduced in the state legislature in 1966 and
1967 to create a state ombudsman office,55 and a similar resolution was
introduced at the 1967 constitutional convention.56 All of these proposals
were dropped without any further action.5 7 A proposal by Nassau County
Executive Eugene Nickerson to create a county ombudsman was met with

54. See Paul Dolan, Pseudo-Ombudsmen: Political Conditions and Traditions
Preventing Full Use of Concept by City Complaint Offices, NAT'L Civic REV., July 1969,
at 298 (writing at the height of ombudsmania, Dolan noted that even when ombudsmen
offices were created, legislators tended to keep their budgets low); see also Paul Dolan,
CreatingState Ombudsmen:A Growing Movement, NAT'L Civic REV., May 1974, at 250.
The legislative fear of a competitor for constituent service was expressed openly in 1993
and 1997 by some supporters of bills introduced in the New York City Council to eliminate
the Public Advocate's Office. See Introduction No. 643 to N.Y. CITY CHARTER (1993);
IntroductionNo. 927 to N.Y. CITY CHARTER (1997). In 1993, one of the bill's sponsors
argued that handling thousands of complaints each year was no big deal because every
elected official in the city is an ombudsman. See COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
MINUTES OFTHE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, Jan. 29, 1993, at 11-12;
see also Memorandum to Introduction No. 927 to N.Y. CITY CHARTER (1997) (insisting,
contrary to the evidence, that the Public Advocate's Office does not perform any constituent
services).
55. See Bronston, Introduction No. 428 and Roger Green, Introduction No. 1134 to
EXECUTIVE LAW (1966); see also Dunne, Introduction No. 2684 and Jonas, Introduction
No. 4013 to LEGISLATIVE LAW (1967); S. Res. 675, Pr. 189, Leg., 1967 N.Y. Sess. Law
Serv. S. Res. 675, Pr. 189 was introduced in the New York City Council on Jan. 31, 1967,
calling upon the state legislature to pass a bill introduced by New York Senator Brennan
amending the General City Law to create an "Office of Public Redress" in cities with
populations over 1,000,000.
56. See N.Y. City Council, Proposition No. 271-A, May 22, 1967. This proposition
called for the creation of an "Office of Legislative Ombudsman." Three similar proposals,
Nos. 200, 261, and 827, were introduced, but none of these proposals were included in the
proposed constitution.
57. The only initiative in New York that succeeded was in the City of Jamestown,
which created an ombudsman office early on. Local Law of the City of Jamestown, No.
3-1970, was signed by then-Mayor Stanley Lundine, who was later elected lieutenant
governor of the state. One-half of Jamestown's population at the time apparently was of
Scandinavian descent. The Jamestown ombudsman was appointed by the mayor, subject
to the approval of the majority of the Council, and exists to this day. See ZAGORIA, supra
note 51, at 42.
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a barrage of partisan invective, and Nickerson eventually created the office
by executive order in 1966.8
New York City officials were equally resistant to the idea, although
executive complaint units had been established in prior years. In 1934, the
City Department of Investigation ("DOI"), which was responsible for
investigating fiscal abuses and other problems in government, established
a complaint bureau to receive complaints from the public. The 1936
Charter codified the complaint function in a new section 804. °
In January 1961, Mayor Robert F. Wagner created a "Box 100"
program. Residents were invited to write to this special mailing address
with complaints and comments on the efficiency of City agencies, including
any evidence of corruption. 61 The first several months produced thousands
of letters, and in 1963, Mayor Wagner turned his "key" to Box 100 over
to the Department of Investigation, 62 where it resides to this day.63
DOI's efforts, however, did not satisfy the desire for an ombudsman
who would be insulated from the control of City Hall.' Then, as now, the

58. See Philip J. Hannon, The Nassau County Ombudsman, in EXECUTIVE
supra note 6, at 111.
59. See NEW YORK, N.Y., LoC. L. NO. 1 (1924).
60. See RICHARD S. WINSLOW & DAVID W. BURKE, ROGUES, RASCALS & HEROES:
A HISTORY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INVESTIGATION, 1873-1993, at 48 (1993); see also
N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 804 (1936).
61. See William H. Angus & Milton Kaplan, The Ombudsman andLocalGovernment,
in OMBUDSMEN FORAMERICAN GOVERNMENT? THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, supra note 47,
at 104-05.
62. See RICHARD S. WINSLOW & DAVID W. BURKE, ROGUES, RASCALS, & HEROES:
A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF INVESTIGATION, 1873 to 1993, at 48
(1993). In November 1966, the Commissioner of the DOI reported that his department had
handled 3,000 complaints that year from Box 100 mail; he subsequently predicted 9,000
would be received in 1967. See Angus & Kaplan, supra note 61, at 104.
63. Box 100 is still used as a City Hall mailing address-but only for complaints of
suspected corruption. See Letter from Kevin R. Ryan, Public Information Office, The City
of New York Department of Investigation, to Peter Wallis (Mar. 21, 1997). The DOI
asserts that an average of 800 letters and 200 phone calls are received each month. The
letter did not indicate whether the DOI compiles any statistical reports or summaries of its
operations or procedures.
64. DOI's closeness to the mayor, particularly under the administration of Rudolph
Giuliani, has undermined its reputation as an independent investigatory agency. During the
1996 scandal over the City's collusive contracting arrangement with the Hellenic American
Neighborhood Association, the FBI decided to force the DOI out of the investigation. See
David Firestone & Don Van Natta Jr., Corruption Watchdog Has Become Mayor's Tool,
Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1996, at 33. Further, DOI's refusal to grant public
access to its final reports-overturned by the court in Lewis v. Giuliani, Index No.
116214/96 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, Apr. 21, 1997)-raises additional questions about its
independence from the mayor. For this reason, Public Advocate Mark Green introduced
a bill in the City Council in 1994 (co-sponsored by Council members Stanley Michels and
OMBUDSMEN IN THE UNITED STATES,
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close relationship between the mayor and the commissioner of DOI
constrained DOI's ability to be completely independent of the executive
agencies subject to its investigatory jurisdiction. 5
In 1965, City Council member at-large, Paul O'Dwyer, began a series
of initiatives to create a truly independent, classic ombudsman office in
New York City. He proposed an amendment to the Charter to create an
O'Dwyer envisioned a powerful non"Office of Citizen Redress."'
partisan office that would be above the political fray.67 The ombudsman
would be appointed by the mayor for a term of six years from a choice of
nominees submitted by a prestigious board composed of the heads of all the
major universities in the city.
The idea apparently provoked as much apprehension as the idea of an
elected ombudsman similar to the Public Advocate's Office. The bill
languished. 68 The following year, in March of 1966, City Council
President Frank O'Connor introduced a similar bill, this time granting the
City Council, rather than the mayor, the power to appoint the Director of
the Office of Citizen Redress. 69 This too failed to garner political support.

Lucy Cruz) to change the method of appointing the DOI Commissioner to make the DOI
more independent of the mayor. See Mark Green, Introduction No. 401 to N.Y. CITY
CHARTER (1994) (amending the New York City Charter, in relation to the appointment and
removal of the Commissioner of Investigation).
65. See Angus & Kaplan, supra note 61, at 107; Dolan, Pseudo-Ombudsmen, supra
note 54, at 279, 301.
66. See Paul O'Dwyer, Introduction No. 766 to N.Y. CITY CHARTER (1965)
(amending the Charter in relation to creating the Office of Director of Citizen Redress).
67. Under O'Dwyer's bill, the director of that office would have had the power "to
receive complaints by any person in regard to the conduct of any agency or any officer or
employee thereof" and "to investigate the conduct and affairs of any agency and the official
conduct of any officer or employee thereof." Id. §§ 11 (d)(1), (2). The Director also was
authorized to "inspect and examine the papers, records and documents of any agency" and
"to issue subpoenas compelling witnesses to appear and the production of records." Id. §
1 (d). Finally, the Director was authorized, at his sole discretion, to issue reports of his
investigations or surveys, to make them public, or submit them only to the mayor or the
agency head. He was required, however, to issue an annual report about the activities of
his office. See id. § 11(e).
68. It was re-introduced in the following year by Council member Diggs but fared no
better. See Introduction No. 5 to N.Y. CITY CHARTER (1966) (amending the Charter in
relation to creating the Office of Director of Citizen Redress).
69. See Frank O'Connor, Introduction No. 70 to N.Y. CITY CHARTER (1966)
(amending the Charter in relation to creating the Office of Director of Citizen Redress). See
also O'Connor's February 17, 1966, press release that summarizes the bill in the Municipal
Reference Library ombudsman files.
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3. The Police Oversight Referendum and the Ombudsman Idea
All of these proposals were introduced in the midst of an extremely
heated and acrimonious battle over the extent to which civilians could
challenge and control abusive police conduct-an issue that continues to
roil the City to this day. 70 When John Lindsay became mayor in January
1966, he attempted to fulfill his campaign promise to create a Civilian
Complaint Review Board to consider complaints against the New York City
Police Department. 7' His initiative was met with powerful resistance. In
November 1966, a proposal to ban the implementation of Lindsay's plan
was submitted to the voters in a referendum.72 After a fierce battle for
public opinion, the referendum passed by a wide margin.73
Ironically, the defeat of the civilian oversight effort gave the notion of
an ombudsman for New York City a big boost of support. A week after
the referendum, the New York Post published an editorial titled An
Ombudsmanfor New York? 74 The Post pointed to Paul O'Dwyer's 1965
bill:

70. See, e.g., Green v. Safir, 664 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1997)
(detailing the public advocate's lawsuit against the police commissioner for resisting the
office's right, under the Charter, to review records of the police department's handling of
substantiated complaints of police abuse), aff'd as modified, 679 N.Y.S.2d 383 (App. Div.
1998); see also Mayor of New York v. City Council of New York, 640 N.Y.S.2d 951
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1995), aff'd, 651 N.Y.S.2d 531 (App. Div. 1997) (concerning the
City Council's abortive effort to create an independent police oversight board, successfully
challenged by the mayor); Peter Vallone, Introduction No. 961 to N.Y. CITY CHARTER
(1997) (amending the City Charter in relation to the establishment of an independent police
investigation and audit board).
71. See Angus & Kaplan, supra note 61, at 104-05.
72. The wording of the proposition was so broad as to arguably exclude any oversight
of the police under any circumstances. Its expansive language was referred to later as "the
sleeper clause":
Neither the Mayor, the Police Commissioner, nor any other office of the City of
New York shall have the power to authorize any person, agency, board or group
to receive, to investigate, to hear or to require or to recommend action upon
civilian complaints against members of the Police Department.
Homer Bigart, Liberties Union Invites Friendsand 'Responsible' Foes of Review Board to
Ombudsman Talks, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 15, 1966, at 47.

73. The referendum, held on November 6, 1966, passed by a vote of 1,307,738 to
768,492. See Angus & Kaplan, supra note 61, at 105.
74. See An Ombudsmanfor New York?, N.Y. POST, Nov. 15, 1966, at 47.
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A useful discussion has emerged with surprising speed in the
aftermath of last week's citywide referendum vote rejecting the
Police Dept.'s Civilian Complaint Review Board.
The question under discussion is: assuming there will be
continuing citizen complaints about police and about city
government generally, how should the city handle them?
Despite the bitter referendum battle ....
for a city "ombudsman."

there is growing support

...This poses the questions how to appoint an ombudsman, how
to insure his absolute political independence, how to define his
duties?

There is a real opportunity at hand to develop a mature, modem
mechanism for handling citizen complaints. 75
The editorial noted that the Commissioner of Investigation considered
himself "a kind of ombudsman" and was "resisting appointment of

another. "76
According to press reports, an unlikely coalition of former enemies
favored the ombudsman idea as a substitute for the Civilian Complaint
Review Board, including, on one side, groups that had fought to abolish the
Review Board, the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, and former Police
Commissioner Vincent L. Broderick, and, on the other side, several
organizations that had fought for the Review Board, including the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP"), the Civil
A New York Citizens
Liberties Union, and several labor unions.'
Committee for an Independent Office of Public Complaints was
subsequently formed, with Vincent Broderick as its chair, to press for
Council legislation establishing an ombudsman. The following June, the
unlikely duo of William F. Buckley, Jr., New York Conservative Party
leader and editor of The NationalReview, and Michael Harrington, socialist

75.
76.
77.

at Al.

Id.
Id.
See Lindsay FavorsIndependent Ombudsman Idea, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 14, 1966,
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activist and author of The Hidden Poor,were named as associate chairmen
of the committee. 78 Buckley commented:
It is strange and heartening that out of the bitterness in New York
City over the Civilian Complaint Review Board for the Police
Department, an idea has been given impetus which seems to have
got the backing of liberals and conservatives alike.79
Mayor Lindsay, however, gave the idea only mixed and lukewarm
support. He was unwilling to relinquish the complaint-handling role of his
Commissioner of Investigation, and questioned whether a citywide
ombudsman would be "overwhelmed" and inaccessible to people in
outlying areas of the city." Lindsay opted instead for a proposal to
establish twenty-seven "Neighborhood City Halls," 81 which City Council
Democratic leader David Ross opposed as "an extension of the Mayor's
political club." 8 2 Ultimately, no agreement was reached on either
approach. 3
The interest in a mechanism for citizen redress did not disappear from
the public agenda, however. In May 1967, City Council President Frank
O'Connor introduced a bill drafted as a model ombudsman statute by the
Administrative Law Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York. 4 It proposed the creation of an Office of Public Complaint,
headed by an ombudsman to be appointed for five years by the mayor with

78. See Ombudsman Group Names 2 Members, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1967, at 32.
79. Id.
80. See Ombudsman Drive Picks Up Steam, LONG ISLAND PRESS, Nov. 15, 1966; see
also Bigart, supra note 72, at 47.
81. See Angus & Kaplan, supra note 61, at 105-06.
82. Ombudsman DrivePicks up Steam, supra note 80 (citing the lineup of lawmakers

supporting or opposing the idea); see also Bigart, supra note 72, at 47.
83. Note that the two proposals-for an ombudsman and for little City Hallsreflected the continuing tension in New York City politics between solving problems
through citywide versus neighborhood-based mechanisms. The various City Charters over
the years reflect the uneasy compromises: Borough presidents are retained and community
and district boards are established, but three citywide elected officials are also retained.

Current City politics also keep the issue alive: while the City is struggling to reform the
child welfare system by decentralizing it, see Nicholas Scoppetta, Protecting the Children

of New York: A Plan of Action for the Administration of Children's Services, Dec. 19,

1996, the school system is being reformed by re-centralization,see 1996 N.Y. Laws 720.
84. See The Committee on Administrative Law, ProposedLocal Lawfor a New York
City Ombudsman, 22 REC. OFTHEASS'N OF THE BAR OFTHE CITY OF N.Y. 484,486 (1967).
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the advice and consent of two-thirds of the City Council.85 The policy
section articulated a broad public mandate for the office:
It is hereby found to be in the public interest to establish an office
of public complaints in New York City, headed by a person of
distinguished accomplishments in the field of law or
administration, whose main functions would be (a) to investigate
and ameliorate grievances arising out of allegations of . . .
maladministration, unfairness, unreasonableness, arbitrariness,
arrogance, rudeness, oppressiveness, inefficiency, improper
motivation, unwarranted delay, clear violations of laws or
regulations, or other abuse of authority, and (b) on its own
initiative, to investigate, study and make recommendations with
regard to agency acts, practices and procedures.86
The Bar Association report explained why such an office is needed in
a democratic society:
The fact that there are such "grievances" is not necessarily due to
deliberate acts on the part of city agencies or employees ....
Many of the cases stem from the size and proliferation of the
bureaucracies, the skyrocketing of costs of governing well,
insufficient personnel, the lack of means of informing people about
available services and procedures, especially for the poor and even
those of modest means, and the enormous pressures on urban life
today resulting from inadequate housing, conflicts in community
relations, dilapidated transportation and the like.8"
Like the 1965 O'Dwyer bill, the Bar Association model gave the
ombudsman broad investigatory authority, including subpoena power. It
also granted the ombudsman the right to inspect all City agencies (except
elected officials and the courts), immunized the ombudsman from judicial

85. See id. at 487. The Bar Association had studied the O'Dwyer and Diggs bills as
well as models drafted by Professor Walter Gellhorn of Columbia University, the most
prominent ombudsman scholar of his time, and another published by the Harvard Journal
on Legislation.
86. Id. This construct has all the elements of the classic notion of an ombudsman:
wide discretionary authority, headed by a "distinguished" person who is appointed, and not
elected, and authorized to address both the micro (individual complaints) and the macro
(broad patterns); see also Proposed Local Law for a New York City Ombudsman, Sec. I,
§ 1170; The Committee on Administrative Law, supra note 84.
87. Id. at 484.
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review of any findings and reports, and made it a misdemeanor to obstruct
any such investigation."8 The model bill also repealed DOI's authority to
handle complaints under Charter section 804, but required the ombudsman
to refer criminal investigations to that agency-a concept ultimately adopted
by the 1989 Charter Revision Commission. 9
Despite the scholarship and non-partisan spirit that produced the Bar
report, the O'Connor bill, like the 1965 O'Dwyer bill, was largely ignored.
However, these defeats in the Council between 1965 and 1967 did not end
Neither the so-called
interest in an ombudsman for the City.
"ombudsmania" nor the social and political turmoil of that era had run its
course. Upon assuming office in January 1969, City Council President
Francis Smith announced that he was forming an ombudsman bureau and
calling for public hearings on a bill to formally establish such an office.
Smith commented on the great need citizens feel for such an office which
"can help our citizens deal with a bureaucracy which often seems
inaccessible and whose actions on occasion seem arbitrary and
capricious. "'
Smith named Abraham N. Goodman, his legislative assistant and
former special assistant to the Commissioner of DOI, to head the volunteerstaffed unit.9 ' Smith had been elected in January 1969 to serve out the term
of Frank O'Connor, however, and he only held the office until the end of
Sanford Garelik, who previously had served as police
the year.
commissioner, was elected that fall to succeed him, and there is no record
of Garelik continuing Smith's ombudsman work. 92
In 1973, Paul O'Dwyer was elected president of the City Council.
When he took office in January 1974, he renewed his campaign to pass a
bill like the one he had introduced as a Council member eight years earlier.
This time he campaigned for months to enlist support from civic and labor
groups, bar associations, and individuals. O'Dwyer held an all-day public

88. See id. at 487-489 (Model Bill §§ 1172, 1175, 1180, and 1181).
89. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 24(k) (1989).
90.

Alfred Miele, Smith Names Ombudsman to Aid Public,DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Jan.

26, 1969, at 44.
91. See id. In November 1969, Mr. Goodman reported a complaint by a Bronx man
who had dialed 911 after being held up but waited an hour and 20 minutes for the police to
arrive. Goodman was quoted as saying, "We have asked the Police Department for the files
on this case . . . and we are also planning to survey the entire emergency police
communications system." Ombudsman Puts in Heavy Day's Work, LONG ISLAND PRESS,

Jan. 28, 1969, at 4B. We have not found any record of whether Goodman received the
files, or any results of the proposed survey. History is repeating itself in the current dispute
between the public advocate and the police commissioner in Green v. Safir, 664 N.Y.S.2d
232 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1997), aff'd as modified, 679 N.Y.S.2d 383 (App. Div. 1998).
92. There is a lack of information for 1969-1974 in the "Ombudsman" files of the
Municipal Reference Library.
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hearing at City Hall in September 1974, 93 and distributed a flier describing
the concept and urging people to write in and to testify. 94 Despite support
from a majority of the Council members, both the mayor, Abraham Beame,
and the Council leadership opposed the idea. 95 Once again, the bill failed.
4. Paul O'Dwyer-New York City's First Ombudsman
Paul O'Dwyer was still the city council president in November 1975,
two years after the defeat of his last bill, when the new complaint oversight
provision in the City Charter was adopted, creating a toe hold for him and
other advocates of a full-fledged office of citizen redress. The narrow
ombudsman-like obligations specified for the city council president in the
1976 Charter 96 were a far cry from the broad powers recommended by
O'Dwyer, O'Connor, and the Bar Association. The new Charter did not
authorize the council president to receive individual complaints and also
failed to articulate any mechanisms, such as subpoena power, for fulfilling
the responsibility to "oversee" and "review" other agencies' efforts.
But O'Dwyer was a great people's advocate. 97 To his everlasting
credit, he saw the window of opportunity and moved swiftly through it.
Pursuing the spirit, if not the letter, of the new Charter language, he
established an ombudsman office under his jurisdiction to deal with "any
and all" complaints and sought an annual budget appropriation of $750,000

93. See Steven Marcus, Ombudsman: O'D Trying Again, N.Y. POST, Sept. 19, 1974.
Among those who testified in favor of the bill were the Swedish Ombudsman Bertil
Wennergren. See id. Norman Adler, then a Hunter College professor and now a political
consultant, opposed the bill just as he later opposed retaining the Office of the City Council
President. See Edward Ranzal, ParadeOf WitnessesBacks City Ombudsman, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 1974, at 79.
94. See The "Ombudsman Project" flier; see also Memorandum from Joe Esposito,
Assistant to the Council President, to all staff members (July 23, 1974) (regarding the
"Ombudsman Bill"). The memo clearly articulates the arguments for creating an
ombudsman and analyzes the reasons legislators and courts are insufficient resources for
citizen grievances. Both documents are in the ombudsman file in the Municipal Reference
Library.
95. See Marcus, supranote 93. O'Dwyer also speculated that some Council members
were covertly uncomfortable with the bill that could, arguably, supplant their own efforts
to gather political support with their constituents by assisting with complaints about the City
bureaucracy.
96. The 1976 Charter reads as follows: "(1) [to] oversee the coordination of city-wide
citizen information and service complaint programs, and (2) review complaints of a
recurring and multi-borough or city-wide nature..." N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 23(e)
(1976, as amended through 1977).
97. See Francis X. Clines, PaulO'Dwyer, New York's LiberalBattlerFor Underdogs
and Outsiders, Dies at 90, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1998, at B9.
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to support it.98 He hired Bernard Frank, a widely published scholar of
ombudsman systems and the Chair of the Ombudsman Committee of the
International Bar Association, as a consultant to "develop[ ] an appropriate
set of regulations for the establishment of a New York Ombudsman."99
O'Dwyer's aggressive approach did not sit well with Roy Goodman,
chairman of the Charter Revision Commission, whose mandate had been
extended until March 31, 1977, to oversee implementation of the new
Charter."° Goodman harshly criticized O'Dwyer in an "acrimonious"
exchange reported in the New York Times:
In more than an hour of testimony at a commission hearing in City
Hall, [O'Dwyer] . . .clashed repeatedly with State Senator Roy
M. Goodman, the commission chairman, who accused him of
attempting to set up an 'elaborate bureaucracy' that was not
mandated by the revised Charter adopted by the voters a year ago.
Goodman said the commission had envisioned the Council
President's function as an 'overseer and coordinator' of city-wide
services that provide information and receive complaints from
citizens. Neighborhood service complaints are to be handled by
the new district service managers serving under local community
boards, while borough-wide service matters are to be dealt with by
borough supervisors.
Mr. O'Dwyer, visibly angered by [Goodman's question about his
budget request], retorted: 'You created this office and now you're
trying to reduce it to a small function. You can't set me up as an
ombudsman, expect me to make government responsive to the
people and then blame me when I fail to do so for lack of adequate
staff.) 101
Using his role on the Board of Estimate, which had extensive power
over the budget under the 1976 Charter, O'Dwyer made a citywide
ombudsman office afait accompli. He obtained a $400,000 appropriation

98.

See Glenn Fowler, O'Dwyer's Concept of His Position Under CharterAssailed

at Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1976, at B2.

99. Letter from Paul O'Dwyer to Bernard Frank (Oct. 18, 1976) (forwarded to the

Public Advocate's Office by Bernard Frank); see also Letter from Bernard Frank, supra

note 5 (stating that he served as a consultant to Paul O'Dwyer in 1976 when the new City
Charter was adopted).
100.

See STATE CHARTER REVISION COMM'N FOR N.Y.

101.

Fowler, supra note 98.

CITY,

supra note 40, at 1.
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and by January 1977, recruited assistants who addressed citizen
complaints." 2 Columnist Murray Kempton, the recently deceased great
chronicler of the City, memorialized the historical moment as well as its
irony:
[O'Dwyer] has been honored and cursed with an entire missing of
his point, which had been that the ombudsman should first of all
be someone who, unlike himself, was not a politician.0 3
O'Dwyer was the trail blazer, but he was not the City ombudsman for
long. Like Winston Churchill, who won the war but was rejected by voters
to lead the peace, O'Dwyer was defeated by State Senator Carol Bellamy
in 1977 in a vigorously contested Democratic primary.'" Bellamy won the
election and became the new city council president. She took on the role
of ombudsman and expanded it well beyond O'Dwyer's-not to mention
Goodman's-concept. Bellamy retained the citizen grievance function and
gave space to a group of volunteer senior citizens operating out of Hunter
College to assist other seniors who phoned in their complaints. This
became an effective "Senior Action Line," which continues to this day. 05
She began issuing investigative reports on aspects of City services,
including the child welfare system, transportation, health care, highway
construction, and park maintenance. She also published a research analysis
of the complaint handling systems, aptly titled "Go Fight City Hall. "106
Andrew Stein, who succeeded Bellamy in 1985 when she gave up her
seat to run unsuccessfully in the Democratic primary for mayor, continued

102. See Murray Kempton, The Ombudsman Tries His Wings, N.Y. POST, Feb. 5,
1977, at 4.
103. Id. Despite his historic role as the architect of the council president's
ombudsman role, Paul O'Dwyer continued to believe that the job ideally should be held by
a non-political appointee, not an elected official. He argued that position publicly during
the Charter Revision debates in 1989. See Todd S. Purdam, Stein ProposesA Stronger
Oversight Role For His Office, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1989, at B2.

104. O'Dwyer ran ahead of Bellamy (30% to 25%) in a five-way primary which
included Assembly member Leonard Stavisky, businessman Abraham Hirschfeld, and City
Council member Carter Burden, but Bellamy defeated him in the subsequent run-off. See
Pranay Gupte, CarolBellamy Wins A Place In Runoff, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 9, 1977, at Al.

105. It is now called the "Public Advocate's Senior Action Line." See THE GREEN
BOOK: OFFICIAL DIRECTORY OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 22 (1994-95).

106.

Bellamy's reports are in the Municipal Reference Library, catalogued under

"City Council President."
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of handling individual complaints and doing investigative
the tradition
07
reports.
By the time the 1989 Charter Revision Commission convened, the
interest in ombudsmen had subsided and the idea had become less
controversial. A handful of state and municipal government general
ombudsman offices had been created, and several more have been
established since that time. 108 Most are now entrenched institutions in their

jurisdictions but have fairly low public profiles."° They focus largely on
handling individual grievances and specific complaints rather than
investigating systemic problems and policy concerns.' 0 Many specialized,
single-issue ombudsman offices have also sprung up, such as ombudsmen
for long-term care, children, the mentally ill, etc."'
The individual complaint-handling function in the Council President's
Office had similarly ceased to be controversial; however, it also ceased to
be highly valued. The other ombudsman role of identifying systemic
problems and issuing reports and expos6s continued to create political

107. See Stein Testimony, supra note 44, at 200-03. More than 30 of Bellamy's
investigative studies are on file at the Municipal Reference Library. Unfortunately, only
four of Stein's documents were deposited there, and the others can be gleaned only from
press reports. Stein's record of complaints handled is contained in Annual Reports issued
by his office between 1990 and 1993, but only the 1990 Annual Report is on file at the
Municipal Reference Library.
108. The best list of current general governmental ombudsmen (as distinguished from
speciality ombudsmen such as children's or long term care ombudsmen) can be found in the
membership lists of the United States Ombudsman Association, located at 215 East 7th
Street, Des Moines, Iowa 50319 < milosec@legis.State. ia.us>. The list includes the states
of Nebraska (legislative); Iowa (legislative); Alaska (legislative); Arizona (legislative);
Hawaii (legislative); Montana (executive); Ohio; Oregon (partial jurisdiction/executive-not
statutory); Puerto Rico (legislative); Rhode Island (nonstatutory executive agency in
governor's office); the cities/counties of Jamestown, N.Y. (the first city ombudsman in the
United States); Atlanta, Ga.; Aurora, Ill. (executive, not defined in law); Detroit, Mich.
(legislative); Flint, Mich. (legislative); Kansas City, Mo. (legislative); Cleveland (Cayuga
County), Ohio (County Executive agency not in statute); Portland, Or.; Dayton, Ohio
(nonprofit corporation with general jurisdiction in city and county); Seattle (Kings County),
Wash. (legislative); Anchorage, Ala. (legislative); and Lexington, Ky. (Fayette County)
(legislative).
109. Several, however, have subpoena power which they use to bring in witnesses for
investigation of individual complaints. See, e.g., NEB. REV. ST. §81-8,245(5) (1995); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 601G.9(4) (West 1995); ANCHORAGE, ALA., MUNICIPAL CODE § 24.55.170
(West 1995).
110. See Conversation with Marie Ferguson, former president, U.S. Ombudsman
Association (Sept. 12, 1997). Ms. Ferguson confirmed that, to the best of her knowledge,
most ombudsman offices do not issue investigative and research reports. An excellent
source of information about government ombudsman offices is now available via e-mail at
< ombgov@staff.legis.state.ia.us>.
111. See, e.g., Brandon, et al., supra note 46, at 1032, n.1238.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

sparks. In testimony before the 1989 Charter Revision Commission, Stein
argued that his office provided a powerful check on the mayoral
agencies." 2 He pointed to his expos6 of the emergency medical services,
his proposal to use the fire department as a first responder in cases of
cardiac arrest, and his efforts in support of reforming the school custodian
contract. 113
Both Bellamy and Stein, in fact, faced uphill battles in their efforts to
perform their investigative audits. Despite the power that flowed from the
council president's votes on the Board of Estimate, the absence of express
authority to obtain information from reluctant mayoral agencies posed
serious problems and delays in their work."' The tension between the
council president's mandate to identify and expose problems in City
government and the mayoral agencies' resistance to oversight continues to
be a constant theme in the public conflicts between council presidents and
mayors. It was also an issue that the 1989 Charter Revision Commission
was well aware of, and which it addressed in the new Charter.
II. THE 1989 CHARTER REVISION COMMISSION DEBATES AND THE
COUNCIL PRESIDENCY

The members of the 1989 New York City Charter Revision
Commission,11 5 set out to revise the Charter to comply with the Supreme
Court's ruling in Board of Estimate v. Morris,"6 and, in so doing,
overhauled the entire system of City governance. " 7 Among the many
challenges they faced was the question of what to do with the Council
President's Office-this unique New York City institution that belongs in
no one branch of government but has deep roots in the City's history.

112.
113.
114.

See Stein Testimony, supra note 44, at 199.
See id.
See id.; see also Legislative Hearing, Mar. 9, 1989, at 131-34 (testimony of

Susan Wiviott).
115. The New York City Charter Revision Commission, appointed by Mayor Edward
I. Koch on January 19, 1989, was chaired by Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., former
corporation counsel of the City of New York. The other members were Aida Alvarez,
Amalia V. Betanzos, Fred Friendly, Simon Gourdine, Judah Gribetz, Nathaniel Leventhal,

Harriet R. Michel, Theresa M. Molloy, Patrick J. Murphy, Archibald R. Murray, Mario
Paredes, Bernard Richland, Joseph P. Sullivan, and David Trager.

116. 489 U.S. 688 (1989) (holding that the Board of Estimate-the upper house of the
City's bicameral legislature-violated the constitutional principle of one-person, one-vote
by giving equal voting power to boroughs with large differences in the size of their
populations).

117. The new Charter was adopted by the voters in a referendum on November 4,
1989.
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Under the 1976 Charter, as explained above, the council president,
who presided over the City Council, was first to succeed the mayor," 8 and
had a narrowly defined role in overseeing agency complaint-handling
systems. 9 The council president's votes on the upper legislative body, the
Board of Estimate, however, were the fulcrum of its power. The
Commission was thus faced with the question of whether to eliminate the
office and break with the century-and-one-half-old tradition of maintaining
at least two citywide elected officials other than the mayor, 20 or to
maintain and redesign the office. Three of the Commission's fifteen
members-Judah Gribetz, David Trager, and Fred Friendly-argued
that the office should
strenuously and repeatedly during the deliberations
2
not survive the demise of the Board of Estimate. '
This minority argued that because the office had no direct
governmental authority, it would be a useless layer of bureaucracy and a
mere launching pad for higher elected office. 12 Fred Friendly asserted that
the council president would "have his own agenda" and would be running
for mayor from the moment he or she took office. He thought this would
be terribly divisive and "make the Mayor's life miserable from the
beginning . . . [by being] a political gadfly. '2 Moreover, some
118. This order of succession is mandated by N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 2-a(2)
(McKinney 1980).
119. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 23(e) (1976, as amended through 1977). Both
Stein and Bellamy used the ombudsman function in far broader fashion than the actual 1976
Charter language had specified. In this sense, they followed O'Dwyer's lead. See Fowler,
supra note 98.
120. See R. Alta Charo, supra note 12, at 742 (discussing the role of the council

president on the Board of Estimate).
121. Several editorial boards, political pundits, and even former city council presidents
agreed, and some predicted, that the Board of Estimate would not survive as an institution
of government. See, e.g., About Politics; Charta Coursefor Boroughs,NEWSDAY (N.Y.),

May 30, 1989, at 42, in which former City Council President Carol Bellamy, in an article
co-authored with William Josephson, Chairman of a subcommittee of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, gave the Charter Revision Commission an "F" for retaining
the office; Robert F. Wagner, Jr., Recommendations of the Citizens Union to the New York
City Charter Revision Commission, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 591, 591-95 (1988); Sam
Roberts, CampaignMatters; Call Him Provost or Chamberlain or Just Employed, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 29, 1989, at 25 (quoting former holders of the office).
122. See Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 234 (statement of Commissioner Friendly);

Public Meeting, June 20, 1989 at 188 (statement of Commissioner Trager); Public Meeting,
July 31, 1989, at 249 (statement of Commissioner Gribetz).
123. Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 235. In fact, Friendly's concerns were not
supported by the historical record. Since 1901, only seven of the 32 individuals who have
held the office of the president of the board of aldermen/city council have run for mayor
(including Andrew Stein, who dropped out before the primary). Of these seven, only Carol
Bellamy ran against an incumbent mayor-and even that occurred when the incumbent
sought a third term, something now impossible under term limits. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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commissioners, most notably Alvarez, wanted to replace the elected office
with an appointed City ombudsman modeled after that used in other cities
and states, 24 and create a vice mayor instead, which could facilitate the
election of minority candidates to citywide office."Z

Other voices in the Commission, however-whose views ultimately
prevailed by a substantial margin-insisted that it was essential to retain a
citywide elected official as an alternate voice to that of the powerful and
centralized mayor. Commission Chairman Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr.,
former City corporation counsel under Mayor Edward
I. Koch, 126 was a
27
view.'
that
of
advocate
persistent and persuasive
Several organizations and individuals testified in favor of maintaining
the office while others urged eliminating or restructuring it. 128 Andrew

THE CITY OF NEW YORK, supra note 15, at 230, 737-44.
124. See Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 241.
125. This diversity issue generated a lot of controversy, including strenuous opposition
by some Commission members and prominent black and Latino spokespersons who argued
that a minority vice mayor would merely be "window dressing." Congressman Major R.
Owens, for example, wrote that a vice mayor on the mayor's ticket "would lack the
independence or the constituency to be truly heard and have any effect on government
policy. Inevitably the position would be regarded as impotent by all New Yorkers-and
thus as tokenism by the minority communities it is supposed to empower." Letter from
Major R. Owens, Congressman, to Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New
York City Charter Revision Commission (May 8, 1989) (Charter Revision Commission
Proceedings, Exh. 56-e); see also Letter from Hazel Dukes, President of the New York
State NAACP, to Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter
Revision Commission (May 9, 1989) (Charter Revision Commission Proceedings, Exh. 56d) (expressing similar views).
126. Notably, three of the commissioners who had served in high positions in City
government strongly supported retention of the office as a watchdog, including former
Corporation Counsels Fritz Schwarz and Bernard Richland, and former Deputy Mayor Nat
Leventhal. Judah Gribetz was the only former City official who disagreed.
127. See Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 205; Public Meeting, May 13, 1989, at
300; Public Meeting, June 20, 1989, at 227; Public Meeting, July 31, 1989, at 257.
128. See New York City Charter Revision Commission Appendices IX and X. One
notable supporter of the office was Richard Emery, the civil rights attorney who
successfully litigated Board of Estimate v. Morris before the Supreme Court. Letter to the
Editor,N.Y. TIMEs, May 19, 1989, at 34, col. 5; see also Pols and Politics;A Word From
Mom andKeeping ItAll in the Family, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), May 26, 1989, at 18; Letter from
Stanley Hill, District Council 37, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees (AFSCME), to Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City
Charter Revision Commission (May 5, 1989) (Charter Revision Commission Proceedings,
Exh. 56-a) (urging retention and strengthening of council presidency); Letter from Herman
Badillo, of Fischbein Badillo, to Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York
City Charter Revision Commission (May 9, 1989) (Charter Revision Commission
Proceedings, Exh. 56-b) (opposing vice mayor idea and supporting retention of city council
president as next-in-line to mayor); Letter from Calvin 0. Butts III, Executive Minister of
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Stein, the incumbent, lobbied heavily for keeping the office. He pointed
to his investigative reports and exposds and the thousands of citizen
complaints his office handled each year. 29 Stein and his staff also
identified what they regarded as a key impediment to the effectiveness of
the office-recalcitrant agencies and the Charter's failure "to require that
[they] comply with [his] requests for information."
Citing several
examples,'I' he urged the Commission to strengthen the council president's
power to obtain information and suggested extending the City Council's
power to issue subpoenas to the council president.'3 2
Friendly's concern about the office holder's possible political ambitions
was discussed extensively during these proceedings. Several members did
not agree that political ambition would be detrimental to the effectiveness
of the office. Schwarz's response, for example, was that "the very political
ambition that you worry about, ought to serve not as something that causes
the person to misbehave, but that causes the person to want to demonstrate
that they are capable of being positive and affirmative. ,133 Schwarz
continued:
I think if the public heard four years of someone being just a
gadfly, just saying, you stink, without coming forward with
workable and affirmative ideas, I think they'd say well,13you make
a good gadfly, but you wouldn't make a good Mayor.
Commissioner Gourdine took the argument even further:
I think that there is a value in having that Citywide official be
elected even though we recognize that person has political
ambitions. I think it's the political ambitions that are important,
you know, to that mix, that the person is, in fact, questioning the
Mayor, challenging policies and putting those policies under the

spotlight. 135

The Abyssinian Baptist Church, to Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New
York City Charter Revision Commission (May 9, 1989) (Charter Revision Commission
Proceedings, Exh. 56-c).
129. See Stein Testimony, supra note 44, at 198-202.
130. Id. at 200.

131. See id.
132. See id. at 201.
133. Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 236.
134. Id.
135.

Id. at 221.
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The commissioners also addressed the related question of whether it was
appropriate for an ombudsman to be elected. David Trager argued
against it:
The theory being advanced is the notion we need a Citywide office
to act as a counter-poise to the Mayor, and I can accept that
But I cannot accept the premise that the function of
premise.
that office, at least the way it's being touted now, is consistent
with the role of an ombudsman, because that role has traditionally,
as it developed in Scandinavian countries, the notion was,
essentially, of a person who would rise above politics . . .
otherwise it just becomes a nice job to advance one's career,
because it's easy to recommend proposed changes . . that's a
recipe with [sic] a job with power and no responsibility.' 3 6
Trager was right about the Scandinavian model, but several members of the
Commission thought it absolutely essential that New York City's
ombudsman be elected, not appointed.' 37 Chairman Schwarz noted:
[W]e want
the people
elected by
Mayor ....

someone else out there . . . who has been elected by
as a whole, who has the credibility of having been
the people as a whole, to stand in criticism of the
Having been elected Citywide, itself, creates clout.'38

Commissioner Bernard Richland agreed:
The ombudsman position works only if you have power,
independent power, and that is what [O'Dwyer] discovered. He
discovered that because he was a member of the Board of
Estimate, and, by God, they had to pay attention to him. An
ordinary ombudsman, appointed by somebody, even with a term
of office, would have nothing like that kind of power or
standing. 39

136. Public Meeting, May 13, 1989, at 325-26.

137. Commissioner Gribetz-agreeing with Commissioner Trager that an ombudsman
should not be elected-suggested at one point that the Commission look at other ombudsman
models. See Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 212. Apparently this did not occur-at least
in any systematic fashion. See supra note 46.
138. See Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 205-06 (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 200.
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I think that his activity as an ombudsman is enormously improved
by the circumstance that he is a separately elected person with
some muscle . . .. Without muscle in this city you can't get
anywhere .
140
Commissioner Theresa Molloy concurred as well:
We talked about an elected ombudsman who would do two things:
It would, first of all, somehow, be, in my words, a court of
appeals; someplace where citizens or groups had no place else to
go there would be a court of appeals or a place they could go to.
But more importantly, as a watchdog over all of the delivery of
services and what came out. 141
The discussions about the office were complicated by the proposal to
create a vice mayor to supplement or replace the council president. As a
result, the Commission debated the future of the office on at least five
occasions, 142 took three separate votes, and finally decided 9 to 4 (with one
abstention) to retain the office substantially in its historic form with some
added responsibilities, described infra in section 111.143 Just prior to the
final vote, Commission Chairman Schwarz articulated his vision of the
raison d'etre for the office:
This is an issue which we properly spent a lot of time on because
it's important, and I will try and summarize for myself why I
believe the job is one of continuing value to the city.

140.

Public Meeting, May 13, 1989, at 321.

141.

Id. at 312.

142. The major discussions can be found in the transcripts of Public Meetings that
took place on May 6, 1989; May 10, 1989; May 13, 1989; June 20, 1989; June 26, 1989;
and July 31, 1989 (when the final vote was taken). An article in the New York Times stated
that it was one of the few subjects that provoked significant rancor among the Commission
members. See Alan Finder, Wat Gets CharterPanelAll Riled Up?, N.Y. TIMEs, July 5,
1989, at B1.
143. The first vote, on May 6, 1989, was nine to four; Chairman Schwarz and
commissioners Michel, Betanzos, Gourdine, Murphy, Molloy, Richland, Murray, and
Leventhal voted "yea"; Commissioners Trager, Gribetz, Alvarez and Friendly voted "nay."
See N.Y. CITY CHARTER, Exhibit 58 (1989). The second vote, on June 20, 1989, was ten

to four. See Public Meeting, June 20, 1989, at 279. The final vote, on July 31, 1989, was
nine to four with the same voting patterns as those on May 6, except that Commissioner
Molloy abstained. See Public Meeting, July 31, 1989, at 273.
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The first two reasons have to do with, in the good sense, the
political structure of the government, and this is a complex, huge
city with many different aspirations and views among its people,
and with great variety among its people.
It seems to me, after weighing all the arguments for that there be
not just one citywide official who stands as an alternate to the
Mayor, but two alternates in the sense of serving in government
as a citywide official and being able to present from a citywide
perspective disagreement or concurrence.
In the broadest sense, I think there is a balance. . . conceptually
between the comptroller and the council president in the sense of
oversight of city programs from the executive branch.
The one concentrating on the fiscal cost efficiency elements of the
programs, the other concentrating on the service implications of
the programs, . . . I think that balance has attractiveness when
you think about the twin aspects of government, that you deliver
things effectively fiscally and deliver things effectively . . .
humanly."14
Schwarz's comments echoed those in the Center report to the 1975
Commission fifteen years earlier: balance, counterweight, and citywide
presence-all the historic roles for the council president. 45
The lengthy debates in 1989, however, did not put to rest the
controversy over the council presidency. In late 1992, Mayor David
Dinkins and Speaker Peter Vallone discussed placing a referendum on the
November ballot to eliminate the office, but they could not agree on how
to divide up the office's limited powers-in particular, the succession to the
mayor and the appointment of a Planning Commission member. 4 6 In
January 1993, one bill to eliminate the office through a referendum,' 4 7 and

144. Public Meeting, July 31, 1989, at 257, 259-60.
145. See supra Part ]B. There is no evidence that any of the commissioners realized

they were breaking new ground by creating the only elected ombudsman in the United
States, and possibly the world.
146. See James Bennet, Aides to Dinkins and Vallone in Talks to Abolish Stein's Job,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1992, at B39; Bob Liff, Ax Spares Stein's Job, NEWSDAY (N.Y.),
Aug. 22, 1992, at 10.

147. See Council Members Fusco, Pagan, Harrison, and Sabini, IntroductionNo. 643
to N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE (1993) (amending the New York City Charter in relation to
repealing section 24 of the Charter and abolishing the office of the president of the City
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one to change the name to public advocate, 4 8 were introduced in the
Council. Both bills were considered at a public hearing on January 29,
1993, 49 and several public officials testified for and against the proposal.' 50
Speaker of the City Council Peter Vallone urged keeping the office but
changing its name. 5' The good government groups that weighed in were
divided: Citizen's Union urged the abolition of the office,' 52 but the New
York Public Interest Research Group ("NYPIRG") 5 3 argued against
altering the 1989 Charter without more studies and a clear mandate from
the electorate.' 54
In the end, the City Council resolved simply to change the name of the
office to "Public Advocate"'' 55 to more accurately reflect its Charter roles
and to dispel the impression that the holder exercised a predominant role

Council).
148. See Council Member Vallone, Introduction No. 624-A to N.Y. CITY ADMIN.
CODE (1993) (changing the title of the president of the council to the public advocate).
149. See generally Council of the City of New York, The Transcript of the Minutes
of the Committee on Governmental Operations, Jan. 29, 1993; see also Douglas Feiden,
Many Vying to Fill Stein's Council Shoes, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Feb. 15, 1993, at 9;
Editorial, Let the Ax Fall,NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Feb. 3, 1993, at 48; Sheryl McCarthy, Does
Anyone Really CareIf We Scrap Stein's Job, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Feb. 1, 1993, at 8.; Selwyn
Raab, "President"Is Confusing; Council May Alter Title, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1993, at

25.
150. Council members Israel Ruiz and Stephen DiBrienza, State Senator Donald
Halpern, and Police Benevolent Association President Ron Reale-all of whom had
expressed interest in running for the position-urged its retention. See generally Transcript
of the Minutes of the Committee on Governmental Operations, Jan. 29, 1993.
151.

See id. at 3-7.

152. Henry Stern, speaking as president of the organization, said the city council
presidency was "the verniform appendix of city government [which] should be excised
from the body politic." Id. at 68. He argued that the office was obsolete, used primarily
as a bully pulpit for those seeking other elective office, and the advocacy role could be done
better by the comptroller. See id. at 67-72.
153. See id. at 42-51.
154. During these debates, City Council President Andrew Stein cited the steady flow
of demands for help from his ombudsman unit. His 1991 Annual Report cited responses
to 19,416 requests for help, and he again provided the figure of 19,000 in an interview in
1993. See McCarthy, supra note 149. The 1991 report, required by the New York City
Charter chapter 2, section 24(n), was 10 weeks late, see Bob Liff, Did the Dog Eat Andy
Stein's Report?, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Jan. 11, 1992, at 11, thus adding fuel to the argument
that the office was a waste of taxpayer money. During the past four years, the Public
Advocate's Office has taken the October 31 deadline very seriously, and Green has
delivered a completed Annual Report to the speaker each year on or before that date.
155. See NEW YORK,N.Y., Loc. L. No. 19 (1993). The bill to eliminate the office
was re-introduced in 1997 by Republican Council Member John A. Fusco but was ignored
by most Council members and the press.
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in the City Council. 56 The Charter Revision Commission had discussed
the same idea, and even created a subcommittee to suggest a new name,
but it never reached a decision.1 7 Some thought the 1993 name change
diminished the office's status and prestige, but others, including Mark
Green-who by then was considering running for the office-thought it was
a great improvement since it clearly identified the officeholder as the
public's voice in government.
III. THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR NEW YORK CITY:
THE OFFICE CREATED BY THE 1989 CHARTER
A. The CharterRevision Commission's Handiwork
The office ultimately created by the 1989 Charter is a political and
historical anomaly, with one foot in the legislative branch (presiding officer
of the City Council), one in the executive (next-in-line to the mayor)'58 and
an eye on the City bureaucracy (ombudsman). Elected for a term of four
years at the same time as the mayor' 59 and on a separate ballot line, the
public advocate has five major areas of responsibility and several subsidiary
ones.

156. There was considerable speculation inthe press that the bill to eliminate the office
was defeated in part because the incumbent, Andrew Stein, was planning to run for mayor
in the Democratic primary, and abolishing his job during the campaign would have been

viewed as a political attack by the mayor. See James C. McKinley, Jr., A New Job For
Stein, Without a Race?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1993, at B3.

157. It appears that the name "Public Advocate" was discussed informally during the
1989 Commission Meetings. At one point Commissioner Schwarz refers to the office by

that name. See Public Meeting, July 31, 1989, at 260.

158. The New York City Charter notes:

In case of the suspension of the mayor from office, the mayor's temporary
inability to discharge the powers and duties of the office of mayor by reason of
sickness or otherwise, or the mayor's absence from the city, the powers and
duties of the office of mayor shall devolve upon the public advocate or the
comptroller in that order of succession.

.

..

N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 1 § 10(a) (1989, as amended through 1997).
159.

See id. ch. 2 § 24(a).

1998]

THE PUBLICADVOCATE FOR NEW YORK CITY

1. Legislative Roles in the City Council
The public advocate is the presiding officer of the City Council but
may vote only in case of a tie, 160 which apparently has rarely, if ever,
occurred in the modem history of the Council. 61 A tie is not likely to
occur in an odd-numbered Chamber dominated by one party and its
speaker. 62 The public advocate may also sit ex officio on committees1 63
and introduce and sponsor legislation." 6
2. The Bureaucracy Beat
The public advocate serves as the City's ombudsman on both the macro
and micro levels. The 1989 Charter added a considerable amount of new
language to the limited ombudsman provision in the 1976 Charter. 65 The
166
public advocate is responsible for processing individual grievances,
investigating and reporting on recurring and citywide problems, 67

160.

See id. § 24(e).

161. Interviews with Richard Weinberg, General Counsel, New York City Council,
and Herbert Berman and Stanley Michels, New York City Council members, in New York,
N.Y., Dec. 16, 1998.
162. During Mark Green's first term as public advocate, the Council consisted of 45
Democrats and six Republicans, and was led by a very powerful speaker, Peter F. Vallone.
Vallone usually did not bring matters to a vote on the Chamber floor unless he had the votes
to prevail. However, since a two-term limit went into effect as of January 1994, there will
be significant turnover in membership by 2001. Ten new Council members took office in
January 1998, and by January 2002, 40 of the members in office as of mid-1998 will have

been "termed out." The current power relationships, as well as the imbalance between
Democrats and Republicans, could change significantly as a result.
163. See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE ch. 2 § 3-203 (1985).
164. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 22(a) (1989, as amended through 1997)

(identifying the public advocate as a member of the Council).
165. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 23(e) (1976, as amended through 1977).
166. As to these grievances, "[tihe public advocate shall establish procedures for
receiving and processing complaints, responding to complainants, conducting investigations,
and reporting findings, and shall inform the public about such procedures." N.Y. CITY
CHARTER ch. 2 § 24(g) (1989, as amended through 1997).
167. As to these problems:
[t]he public advocate .

.

. shall (1) monitor the operation of the public

information and service complaint programs of city agencies and make proposals
to improve such programs; [and](2) review complaints of a recurring and
multiborough or city-wide nature relating to services and programs, and make

proposals to improve the city's response to such complaints. .

..
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performing discretionary reviews of City agencies, 68 and monitoring the
public information and service complaint programs of City agencies. 6 9
The commissioners' intent, articulated in their deliberations, was to
ensure multiple sources of oversight of the executive agencies, with the
comptroller doing fiscal oversight and the public advocate doing the
parallel "service" oversight.' 70
After some debate and research by staff, the Commission also decided
to give the office wide berth in the scope of its jurisdiction.'7 The final
language restricted the scope of the officeholder's powers in only a small
number of circumstances, for example, when an individual grievance is one
that a City agency "is mandated by law to adjudicate" or is covered by a
collective bargaining agreement. 7 2 In addition, if the public advocate
obtains evidence of violations of criminal law, the matter must be referred
immediately to an appropriate law enforcement agency and the public
advocate may "take no further action." 7 3 The same rule applies to
evidence of conflicts of interest, which must be referred to the Conflicts of
Interest Board established by Charter chapter 68.174

Id. § 24(t).
168. Id. § 24(h).
169. The Charter reads:

-

Except for those matters which involve conduct which may constitute a violation
of criminal law or a conflict of interest, the public advocate may, on the request
of a resident, taxpayer, community board, council member or borough president,
or on his or her own motion, inquire into any alleged failure of a city officer or
agency to comply with any provision of the charter.

Id. § 24(i); see also id. § 24(h).
170. See Public Meeting, July 31, 1989, at 257, 259-60.
171. See id.
172. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 24(f)(4)(i) (1989, as amended through 1997).
An opinion by corporation counsel, given to the Charter Revision Commission, stated that
the four agencies covered by the "mandated adjudication" provision are the Civil Service
Commission, the Human Rights Commission, the Taxi Commission, and the Board of
Standards and Appeals. See Memorandum from Paul Refren, Chief of the Division of
Legal Counsel, Corporation Counsel, to Eric Lane, Counsel and Executive Director, 1989
New York City Charter Revision Commission (June 21, 1989) (on file with the New York
Law School Law Review); see also Public Meeting, June 26, 1989, at 361-68.
173. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 24(k) (1989, as amended through 1997).
174. See id. ch. 68 § 2602(a) (1989).
If the public advocate receives a complaint alleging conduct which may constitute
a violation of criminal law or a conflict of interest, he or she shall promptly refer
the complaint regarding criminal conduct to the department of investigation or,
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The commissioners discussed, and rejected, proposals to further
narrow the agencies and circumstances subject to the public advocate's
review. 7 5 The Commission also decided to make only a handful of the
public advocate's oversight responsibilities mandatory or required on an
annual basis. 76 The selection and timing of the others"7 is left to the
officeholder's discretion. 78 A significant portion of the public advocate's
job is to identify patterns of problems and address them systemically. The
Charter language reflects the understanding that handling grievances one-

by-one is often inadequate and, for that reason, it authorizes, and in some
cases mandates, a variety of investigations as well as the power to hold
hearings.'7 9
Troubled by the difficulty encountered by Stein's staff in obtaining
documents, but reluctant to place a power as weighty as the issuance of a

as applicable, to the appropriate prosecuting attorney or other law enforcement
agency and shall refer the complaint regarding conflict of interest to the conflicts
of interest board .... Unless otherwise provided by law, all complaints received
and any investigative file prepared or maintained by the public advocate regarding
matters covered by this subdivision, shall be confidential.
See N.Y.

CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 24(k) (1989, as amended through 1997).
175. See Public Meeting, June 20, 1989, at 240-52.
176. See, e.g., N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 24(f) (1989, as amended through 1997)
("[Tihe public advocate shall.., review complaints of a recurring and multiborough or
city-wide nature. ... "); Id. § 24(n) ("Not later than the thirty-first day of October of each
year, the public advocate shall present to the council a report on the activities of the office
during the preceding fiscal year.").
177. See, e.g., id. § 24(f)(1) ("monitor the operation of the public information and
service complaint programs of city agencies"); id. § 24(f(2) ("review complaints of a
recurring and multiborough or city-wide nature"); id. § 24(f)(4) ("resolve... individual
complaints); id. § 24(h)(1) ("the public advocate may review. . . the implementation of
the requirements for coterminality of local services"); id. § 24(h)(3) ("the public advocate
may review ... the responsiveness of city agencies to individual and group requests for
data or information regarding the agencies' structure, activities and operations").
178. The reasoning behind this language is explained in colloquies among
commissioners. Some Commission members were concerned that the Charter language not
be phrased to require the council president to do an annual audit of every City agency. See
Public Meeting, June 20, 1989, at 256-61; N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 §§ 24(g)-(h) (1989,
as amended through 1997) (using the discretionary "may" language).
179. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 24(f)(2) ("[The public advocate shall . ..
review complaints of a recurring and multiborough or city-wide nature.. . ."); id. § 24(g)
(stating that the public advocate may conduct investigations of unsatisfactory agency
response to complaints and issue reports and recommendations for administrative, legislative
or budgetary actions); id. § 24(h) (stating that the public advocate may review the programs
of City agencies); id. § 24(m) (stating that the public advocate has the power to hold
hearings).
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subpoena in the hands of a single individual,1 80 the Commission created a
compromise. It added a provision to the Charter that requires City
agencies to respond to the public advocate's requests for documents "in [a]
timely fashion." 8 ' It also authorizes the public advocate to go to a
committee of the City Council if he or she wishes to obtain a subpoena.
The text reads as follows:
The public advocate shall have timely access to those records and
documents of city agencies which the public advocate deems
necessary to complete the investigations, inquiries and reviews
required by this section. If a city agency does not comply with the
public advocate's request for such records and documents, the
public advocate may request an appropriate committee of the
council to require the production of such records
8 2 and documents
pursuant to section twenty-nine of the Charter.'
The Charter Revision Commission added this section to the Charter to
give the public advocate some leverage in dealing with mayoral or other
agencies and to ensure tht the problems encountered by city council
presidents before 1989 were not repeated.' 83 It also added the provision
about the City Council to make clear that the public advocate, although not
1 84
a voting member of the Council, could obtain a subpoena from that body.
The Commission also left intact Charter section 1109, an anti-corruption
provision that has been in every Charter since 1873. This unusual

180. See Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 192-95.
181. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 240) (1989, as amended through 1997). The
Commission did not, however, make the public advocate's authority to go to the Council
the sole and "exclusive" remedy for the mayoral agencies' violation of § 240). See Green
v. Safir, 664 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1997), aff'das modified, 679 N.Y.S.2d
383 (App. Div. 1998); infra note 272 and accompanying text. The Charter transcripts
contain no hint that the Commission, by extending the Council's subpoena power to the
council president, intended to bar the latter from turning to the courts for relief. Indeed,
the Commission left intact another provision of the Charter, chapter 49, section 1109,
discussed infra at notes 185-86 and accompanying text, which has long permitted the
council president to go directly to court on certain matters.
182. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 240) (1989, as amended through 1997).
183. See, e.g., Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 199-201; Legislative Hearing, Mar.
9, 1989, at 25-27, 115-20, 122, 131-34.
184. See Stein Testimony, supra note 44, at 201. There is no definitive Charter
history on the reason for the "subpoena" clause in § 240), but Commission staff, including
Eric Lane, who was executive director/counsel, and Frank Mauro, who was director of
research, remember that as its likely purpose.
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provision, which has never been used by an elected official, 8 1 authorizes
the public advocate (and certain other elected officials, or any five
taxpayers) to go to court and seek a summary judicial inquiry "into any
alleged violation or neglect of duty in relation to the property, government
or affairs of the city

.

.. '86

3. The Public Advocate as "Charter Cop"
The Charter designates the public advocate as the official responsible
for ensuring enforcement of the provisions enacted in 1989, for
investigating violations of the Charter,' 87 and for reporting annually on the
progress of its implementation."'8 Consistent with this Charter oversight
role, the public advocate chairs a new information oversight body,8 the
9
Commission on Public Information and Communication ("COPIC").l
COPIC's purpose is to oversee, encourage, and improve public access
to government information. It is authorized to hold hearings and required
to "render advisory opinions" in response to elected officials or members
of the public on aspects of the Charter or "other laws which require public
access" to information' 90 on the model of the State Committee on Open
Government.191 Finally, the public advocate holds several other ex officio

185. A number of reported cases have been brought since the provision was first
enacted, but all of these cases have been efforts by taxpayers to challenge alleged
misconduct by government officials. See, e.g., Jones v. Beame, 382 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1976); In re Larkin, 295 N.Y.S.2d 113 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1968); In
re City of New York, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 5, 1964, at 14 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
186. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 49 § 1109 (1989, as amended through 1997).
187. See id. ch. 2 § 24(i).
188. See id. § 24(n).
189. See id. ch. 47 § 1061.
190. Id. § 1061(d)(5).
191.

See N.Y. PuB. OFF.

LAW

§ 100 (McKinney 1988). Unfortunately, since the

mayor and the City Council have never provided any funding for COPIC, it has not been
possible to appoint an executive director or other staff to fulfill the plan envisioned by the
Commission. Public Advocate Green's office has provided modest staffing to fill the gap,
but far more could-and should-be done with even a modestly funded COPIC. In July
1998, the Public Advocate staff prepared for COPIC a comprehensive consumer guide to
the New York State Freedom of Information Law and how to use it in New York City,
including a list of the Records Access Officers of both City and State agencies. See
COMMISSION ON PUBLIC INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION, LET THE SUNSHINE IN: How
TO USETHE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW AND THE OPEN MEETINGS LAW IN NEW

CITY

(1998).
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positions, including membership on the Audit Committee,"9 and the Voter
Assistance Commission. 9 3
4. Pension Trustee
The public advocate is one of eleven trustees of the New York City
Employees' Retirement System ("NYCERS"), 194 a pension fund valued at
$37.7 billion as of June 30, 1998.195 He casts one of the seven votes on the
governing board, which makes investment decisions, hears employee
appeals of disability pension denials, comments on and proposes legislative
changes to state pension laws, and generally oversees the proper budgeting
and administration of the NYCERS system.
5. Appointment Powers
The public advocate appoints one member of the City Planning
Commission,' 96 and, with other elected officials, the director of the
Independent Budget Office ("IBO")' 9 and the ten-person Advisory Board
that screens and recommends candidates for the IBO directorship.' 9 Under
state law, the public advocate also recommends to the governor five
appointees to the New York City Transit Authority Advisory Council.' 99

192. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 5 § 97(a) (1989, as amended through 1997).
193. See id. ch. 46 § 1054(a). Under the by-laws of the Queens Borough Public
Library, the public advocate also designates one of that institution's trustees. See BY-LAWS
OF THE QUEENS BOROUGH PUBLIC LIBRARY art. I, § 1 (1996).
194. See N.Y. CITYADMIN. CODE § 13-103(b)(2) (1994). The three citywide officials
and three union representatives cast one vote each. The five borough presidents each cast
one-fifth of a vote.
195. See CALLAN Assocs. INC., INVESTMENT MEASUREMENT SERVICE QUARTERLY
REVIEW, NYC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM 7 (1998).
196. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 8 § 192(a) (1989, as amended through 1997).
Andrew Stein appointed Amanda Burden in 1990, and Mark Green re-appointed her for a
second five-year term effective July 1, 1995.
197. See id. ch. 11 §§ 259-60.
198. See id. The public advocate and the comptrollerjointly appoint the 10 Advisory
Board members, who must meet specified categories of expertise and experience, for
staggered five-year terms. The selection of a director is made from the Board's
recommendations by the public advocate, the comptroller, a Council member selected by
the Council, and a borough president selected by the five borough presidents.
199. See N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1204-a (McKinney 1982).
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B. The PublicAdvocate's Office Under Mark Green
Thus, the Office of Public Advocate is an odd amalgam of roles and
responsibilities, powers, and limitations. The following is a description of
how the first public advocate used the authority granted by the Charter. It
not only chronicles the co-author's work but also sets the stage for
addressing the question posed at the beginning of this article-what
changes, if any, would increase the office's effectiveness and its value to
the residents of New York?
1. The Council Role
Although the public advocate wields the gavel, the speaker, who is the
chosen Democratic majority leader, is the defacto official who controls the
agenda of Council meetings. The public advocate has never been called on
to break a tie in this fifty-one member body, and it is highly unlikely,
although not inconceivable, that such a situation would ever arise.
The public advocate's most important role in the Council, arguably, is
the power to introduce legislation-which is unusual if not unique for an
ombudsman. Green has actively exercised this authority to implement the
results of his investigations and his ideas for reform. Most significant of
these during Green's first term was the "Giuliani-Green" bill to clean up
the $1.5 billion commercial carting industry, enacted as Local Law 42 of
200
During the first months of his second term, the public advocate
19 9 6 .
introduced a series of reforms of the City's campaign finance law2°'
designed to reduce the power of large contributors and corporations and to
enable a broader spectrum of candidates without access to large donors to

200. See NEW YORK, N.Y., LOC. L. No. 42 (1996). In January 1994, shortly after
taking office, Green introduced legislation aimed at creating "managed competition" within
the waste-hauling industry as a way to break the mob-influenced carting cartel and save city
businesses the equivalent of a half a billion dollars per year in overcharges. See Mark
Green, Introduction No. 127 to N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE (1994). The bill established
"competition zones" in which the City would use a competitive bidding process to select one
or two carters that would be authorized to pick up the commercial waste in each of the
designated zones. Each carter in the zones would be required to hire an Independent Private
Sector Inspector General ("IPSIG") to identify problems and prevent corruption. Both the
demonstration districts and the IPSIG idea were incorporated, in modified form, into Mayor
Giuliani's 1995 bill to establish rigorous screening and enforcement procedures for carting
licenses. The resulting joint effort led to Local Law 42 being signed into law on June 3,
1996.
201.

See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE tit. 3 ch. 7 (1996).
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compete for public office. 2°2 The package of three bills, co-sponsored by
Speaker Vallone, became law in the fall of 1998.
Green has also introduced legislation to ban workplace discrimination
against victims of domestic violence, 2°3 to increase whistle blower
protection for City workers, 2°4 to create a New York City False Claims Act
modeled on the federal law,2 5 to create a Department of Investigation that
is more independent of the mayor, 20 6 to create a Licensing Review

Commission to overhaul and rationalize7 the City's regulations (and create
"one stop-shopping" for businesses),20 and to prohibit businesses such as

202. See NEW YORK, N.Y., Loc. L. No. 48 (1998) (amending "the administrative
code of the City of New York in relation to raising matchable contributions for participating
candidates in the [c]ampaign [flinance program who do not accept corporate contributions
and lowering the contribution limits for such programs"); NEW YORK, N.Y., Loc. L. No.
39 (1998) (amending "the charter of the City of New York and the Administrative Code of
the City of New York, in relation to donations accepted and expenditures made on behalf
of candidates elected to certain local offices for purposes of such candidates' transition or
inauguration into office"); NEW YORK, N.Y., Loc. L. No. 40 (1998) (amending "the New
York City Charter in relation to prohibiting an officer or employee of the city or of any city
agency who is a candidate for an elective city office or the spouse of such officer or
employee to appear or otherwise participate in any television, radio or printed advertisement
or commercial or by electronic means on the Internet which is funded, in whole or in part,
by governmental funds or resources on or after January first in the year an election for such
office shall be held"). New York City Local Law No. 48, passed by the Council over the
mayor's veto by a vote of 44 to 4 on Oct. 22, 1998, makes major reforms in New York
City's campaign finance law by providing four-to-one public matching funds for
contributions up to $250 for those candidates who join the campaign finance system,
lowering the maximum individual contribution from $8,500 to $4,500 (for candidates for
citywide office) and banning contributions from political action committees that fail to
register with the campaign finance board.
203. See Mark Green, Introduction No. 400 to N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE (1998)
(amending "the administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to employment
discrimination against domestic violence victims").
204. See Stanley Michels & Mark Green, IntroductionNo. 726 to N.Y. CITY ADMIN.
CODE (1996) (amending "the administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to the
enhancement of protections for whistle blowers").
205. See Mark Green & Stanley Michels, Introduction No. 666 to N.Y. CITY ADMIN.
CODE (1995) (amending "the administrative code of the city of new [sic] York in relation
to authorizing the imposition of a civil penalty against anyone who files a false claim for
payment with the City and to permit private persons to bring actions for such penalties on
behalf of the City and to share in the awarded damages"). Both the whistle blower and false
claims bills were developed cooperatively with co-sponsor Council member Stanley
Michels.
206. See Mark Green, Introduction No. 401 to N.Y. CITY CHARTER (1994).
207. See Mark Green, IntroductionNo. 652 to N.Y. CITY CHARTER(1995) (amending
"the New York City charter, in relation to the creation of a License Review Commission,"
as well as "the powers and membership" of the License Review Commission).
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dry cleaners and hair salons from charging women more than men for
equivalent services.2 "8
2. Individual Grievances/Ombudsman
This is, paradoxically, one of the most important and the least
publicized of the public advocate's responsibilities.
Under Public
Advocate Green, a ten-person ombudsman unit has continued the tradition
established by his predecessors in office, beginning with Francis X. Smith
and Paul O'Dwyer, of providing assistance to thousands of individuals who
contact the office each year in person, by letter, and by phone. 2' They
bring a wide array of complaints and frustrations about the City
bureaucracy. Between January 1994, and July 1998, the office responded
to some 80,000 complaints, which are documented in a computer system
and analyzed
by agency and type of complaint in the office's annual
210
reports.

In the majority of cases, the ombudsman staff refer people to the
appropriate government agency for assistance, as required by Charter
sections 24(t) and (g);211 in other cases they advocate on their behalf to
correct a bureaucratic error; in yet another percentage of cases-such as
private financial or personal disputes or legal battles-staff must help the
complainants understand that, for a variety of reasons, they may try to
208. See Mark Green, IntroductionNo. 804 to N.Y. ADMIN. CODE (1996) (amending
"the administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to the prohibition of
discriminatory pricing"). This introduction, co-sponsored with Council member Eristoff,
was signed by the mayor after its language was moderated at the mayor's insistence. It was
enacted as Local Law 2 of 1998.
209. The requests for assistance from the ombudsman unit continue to grow-and it
is a challenge to keep up with the workload.
210. The extent of interest in the office's services and the success of the ombudsman
unit belie the prediction of one well-known political advisor, Norman Adler, who was
quoted in 1993 as saying the office could not have much impact. "People focus on the
politicians who have helped them .... And when you're City Council President, it's hard
to make that impression." James Bennet, Question No. 1 in the City Council President
Race; Why Would Anyone Want the Job of Mostly Sitting Around Waiting to Break a Tie?,

N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 28, 1993, at 29 (internal quotation marks omitted). Adler was proven
wrong by the outpouring of support for the office during the 1998 Charter Revision
Commission Hearings by constituents who had received assistance and organizations who
were pleased with the office's investigative reports. See discussion inf-ra at notes 297-98
and accompanying text.
211. Such referral is mandatory in three types of cases: where another City agency
is required by law to adjudicate the grievance, see N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch.2 § 24(f)(4)(i)
(1989, as amended through 1997); where a collectively bargained grievance procedure
governs the matter, see id. § 24(f)(4)(ii); and where the complaint alleges "conduct which
may constitute a violation of criminal law or a conflict of interest," Id. § 24(f)(4)(iii).

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

mediate the disagreements but may not be able to resolve them. As a
matter of policy, the office does not intervene where a case is already in
litigation. Some of the individual grievance work is repetitious and
unremarkable. The daily challenge to the ombudsman staff is to make their
best efforts to help distressed grievants suffering from bureaucratic errors
or injustice who are desperate for a place to get a polite hearing
(sometimes, even if there's no way to help). The great reward for the
ombudsperson occurs when he or she successfully untangles the proverbial
red tape and helps a citizen obtain his or her due from the government or
a business. The office's files are replete with letters of gratitude from such
clients. Some typical examples of the ombudsman unit's efforts over the
past four-and-a-half years follow:
*

assisted a 28-year victim of mistaken identity-who had lost
his job and was subject to a warrant for his arrest-by
persuading the child welfare authorities that he was not the
deadbeat dad of a 14-year-old they had been pursuing;

"

obtained restored phone service for a 91-year-old whose home
care aide had secretly run up hundreds of dollars worth of
overseas calls;
responded to a "Dear Santa" letter from a child by arranging
for a homeless family to be reinstated in the section 8 housing
subsidy program to which it was entitled;
obtained an emergency inspection and repair of an elevator
that had been boarded shut, in response to a complaint from
a terminally ill, wheelchair-bound client who lived in a 6thfloor apartment;
persuaded the Buildings Department to rescind an elevator
inspection bill wrongly sent to the owner of a one-story
building;
arranged for a Bronx mother to get $1,420 in back child
support that had been "stuck" in the Human Resources
Administration bureaucracy;
obtained a refund of garnished wages of a constituent who had
already paid off his debt to the City Marshal;
worked with the Bureau of Pupil Transportation Services to
get a new bus for a public school in Manhattan that was using
a dangerously overcrowded school bus;

*

o

o

o

o

o
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* worked with the Police Department to expedite issuance of
accident reports for insurance purposes to victims, scores of whom
complained of waiting more than six months for such reports;
" assisted a constituent who had been trying unsuccessfully for five
weeks to obtain copies of his parents' death certificates so he could
claim his inheritance of securities. 1 2
In some instances a single complaint reveals a pattern of serious
government mismanagement rather than mere bureaucratic bungling or
private consumer fraud or abuse. The ombudsman unit's work in those
cases has a broader impact. To cite a few examples:
" In 1994, in response to nearly 150 complaints of erroneous water
bills, the ombudsman staff met with City officials and private
utilities and won refunds ranging from $250 to $2,500 for 40
complainants. The Department of Environmental Protection
promised to reduce errors and improve customer services through
a centralized billing system (which apparently is not yet in place
as of this writing).
" In response to a single complaint, the ombudsman unit learned that
thousands of single family homeowners were being fined for
failing to file a low-pressure boiler inspection report, even though
one-family homes are exempt from the local law requiring such
reports. The office succeeded in getting many of the violations
removed.
* In 1996, in response to the complaint of an 85-year-old Queens
resident who was conned out of $240, the ombudsman unit
identified a pattern of complaints of fraudulent sales of purported
water-saving devices to senior citizens and referred the matter to
the District Attorney.
" In 1996, a young couple with a newborn baby turned in
desperation to the office because a defective dry cleaning machine
on the ground floor of their residential building was emitting large
and illegal amounts of toxic perchloroethylene ("perc") fumes into
their apartment. The office's intervention and publication of the

212. These are only a sampling of the thousands of cases contained in the ombudsman
unit's computerized data base that records all complaints received, the dates and types of
follow-up, and the resolution. The monthly reports by each staff member also record
victims assisted successfully and amounts of money returned or saved.
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dry cleaner's violations led to a speedy shut down of the
machine.2 13

In 1997, a complainant brought in a home video of police cars

secretly rolling over a sensor to switch a traffic light in front of the
Bronx Zoo from flashing yellow to red, and then, when motorists
failed to make an abrupt stop, slapping them with $125 traffic
tickets. The office assisted the complainant to obtain media
coverage; the trap was confirmed by many other community
members when aired on TV and published in the Daily News. 1 4
The office's success with complaints like these is partly a function of
the expertise and persistence of the ombudsman staff members. It is also
a reflection of the potential power of the public advocate as an elected
official to embarrass a sluggish bureaucracy by reporting the problem to
City Hall or exposing it through a report to the media.2 5

213. The office issued two in-depth studies of the health dangers of perc fumes. See
infra note 247 and accompanying text. The public advocate also introduced a resolution in
the City Council calling for restrictions on dry cleaning equipment in residential buildings.
See Mark Green, Resolution No. 974, PROCEEDINGS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK (1995) ("calling upon the Pataki Administration to expeditiously promulgate rules
restricting hazardous perchloroethylene emissions generated by dry cleaning equipment.
. to protect the health of people who live and work in buildings containing dry cleaning
establishments and workers in dry cleaning establishments" as well as protecting the
environment).
214. See James Rutenberg, Cops' Tricky Light Show: Signal Switcheroo Turns Off
Drivers, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Aug. 26, 1997, at 3. Unfortunately, the New York City
Police Department's response was to arrest the whistle blower that afternoon for a thirteenyear-old outstanding traffic violation. The Public Advocate's Office won his release within
hours, and a judge ruled the violation too stale to pursue. See Dan Barry, GiulianiIs Said
to Consider StrongerPoliceReview Board, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1997, at B2. The mayor
and the police commissioner continued their attack on the hapless whistle blower, however,
by publicly releasing and distorting his rap sheet, in apparent violation of New York
Criminal Procedure Law section 160.55. The man's past history was irrelevant, of course,
to his right to complain about the traffic trap; the administration's adhominem attack on him
sent a clear message to potential whistle blowers: "[T]hink twice before challenging City
Hall." In August 1998, the whistle blower filed a federal lawsuit against the administration
alleging retaliation for exercise of his First Amendment rights. See Schillaci v. Giuliani,
98 Civ. 5583 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (complaint filed Aug. 6, 1998; Answer filed Nov. 16,
1998)).
215. This political reality is articulated in one of the dozens of thank-you letters the
office receives from grateful complainants: "Your avocation [sic] on my behalf worked
wonders when you interceded . . . . The mear [sic] mention of your name jolted these
people into imediate [sic] action . . . ." Letter to Mark Green, Public Advocate (May 14,
1995) (name withheld to protect complainant's identity) (on file with author).
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Some cases that reflect a broad pattern or practice are referred by the
ombudsman unit to the research and investigations unit, discussed later,
which may undertake a broader investigation and publish a report, as it did
in the case of the water meter billing errors.2 16
Finally, in response to the large number of complaints the Public
Advocate's Office receives about the child welfare system-and the
frequent heartbreaking and horrifying reports of fatalities among children
known to the system-the office under Green created a model specialized
child welfare ombudsman project. Child Planning and Advocacy Now
("C-PLAN"), a public-private partnership, 7 was established in May 1995,
to assist families and children who are dealing with the child welfare
system and to investigate and document recurring problems in that
system.118 C-PLAN has a forty-member advisory board of advocates,
government officials, and service providers. In its three-and-a-half years
of existence, it has provided individual assistance and advocacy to more
than 1,400 clients, including foster parents, birth parents, foster children,
foster care agencies, and relatives of children in the system. All told, close
to 4,000 children have been affected by its work.
In addition, C-PLAN is now operating a pro bono legal assistance
network, which recruits and trains private attorneys-some from large law
firms-to handle Family Court cases referred by C-PLAN social work
advocates, and a "Family Court Initiative" that addresses systemic
problems in that venue.219
3. The Bigger Picture-Research and Investigation of Systemic Problems
The public advocate's individual grievance-handling work can usually
be done effectively with limited cooperation from the higher-ups in City
216. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, EXPENSIVE WATER:
WRONG WATER METER BILLS FLOOD CITY RESIDENCES (1995); see also PUBLIC
ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORKERS KEEP GETTING "SLAMMED"
(1996) (responding to complaints of fraudulent switching of long-distance telephone carriers
without the customers' permission).
217. C-PLAN is funded by grants from private foundations to a not-for-profit
corporation, the Accountability Project, which supports municipal reform efforts generated
by the Public Advocate's Office.
218. In January 1996, C-PLAN issued a report recommending the establishment of
a separate agency to deal with child-welfare programs. Later that month, in response to the
death of Elisa Izquierdo-a child long known to the system-Mayor Giuliani announced that
he would remove the Child Welfare Agency from the Human Resources Administration and
establish a new and independent agency, the Administration for Children's Services.
219. The pro bono legal assistance project is operated in conjunction with a training
component provided by Professor Martin Guggenheim at the New York University Law
School.
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Hall, so long as agency line staff respond professionally to individual
problems, which is usually the case. The investigative studies of systemic

problems are, however, far more difficult to accomplish in the face of a
resistant or hostile mayor. 2" The public advocate has aggressively pursued
the role envisioned for the office by the Charter Revision Commission and
has sought to exercise his right under Charter section 24(j) to obtain
documents and information in furtherance of his investigations of City
services.
However, section 24(j), at least as drafted, has proven an
inadequate mechanism for dealing with an administration that is intent on
resisting oversight. 22' The scope of the public advocate's authority to

220. Mayor Rudolph Giuliani has been openly hostile to the existence of the Public
Advocate's Office, and to Green's work, since they both took office in January 1994. The
mayor began his first term by proposing a 23% budget cut for the Office of the Public
Advocate-far beyond that sought for any other elected official. See Allison Mitchell, For
Giuliani and Green It Might As Well Be 1997, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1994, at Al. This
proposed cut was in addition to a 30% cut already enacted in outgoing Mayor David
Dinkins' final budget modification in the fall of 1993. See Jonathan P. Hicks, 6 Candidates
Contendfora Chanceto Define the Retitled Position ofPublicAdvocate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
12, 1993, § 1, at 48. Under the leadership of Speaker Peter F. Vallone, the City Council
restored nearly half of the mayor's proposed cut. This left the new office with a $2.3
million budget for FY 1995, down from Andrew Stein's budget of $3.7 million for FY
1994. The mayor's effort came perilously close to interfering with the public advocate's
ability to perform the Charter responsibilities, which would have been an illegal attempt to
amend the Charter without a referendum. Charter section 38 and State Municipal Home
Rule Law section 23(2)(f) both require a referendum for any law that "abolishes, transfers
or curtails any power of an elective officer." See New York Pub. Interest Research Group
v. Giuliani, 644 N.Y.S.2d 38, 39 (App. Div. 1996) (invalidating a local law that delayed,
by two years, the establishment of the Independent Budget Office because it curtailed the
powers of the elected officials, including the public advocate, who appoint the director and
receive information from the agency). The mayor's campaign to undermine or eliminate
the office was taken up once again in July 1998, when he appointed a Charter Revision
Commission consisting of his close colleagues and supporters. The Commission members
briefly considered eliminating the office. See infra notes 294-95 for further discussion.
221. The vast majority of the requests the Public Advocate's Office has made over the
past four years have been denied, ignored, delayed, or challenged outright as beyond the
office's purview. As a general policy, mayoral agencies have refused to acknowledge the
public advocate's authority under Charter section 24(j), and often have responded by
treating requests for information from the public advocate as Freedom of Information Law
("FOIL") requests-the state law designed for the general public-and then denying the
requests anyhow. In addition, mayoral agencies frequently refuse to respond unless the
public advocate identifies, in advance, the nature, scope, and purpose of the request-in
other words, permits the agencies to pre-screen each inquiry. Under Mayor Giuliani, City
Hall is widely known to retain centralized control over the release of information to other
public officials as well as the general public. See Editorial, A Stonewall at City Hall, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 1998, at A18; see also Public Meeting, N.Y. CITY COMM'N ON PUB. INFO.
AND COMMUNICATION, July 10, 1997, at 17-73 (where advocacy groups testified about their
difficulty in obtaining information from mayoral agencies). The courts invalidated this
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obtain documents has been a source of constant conflict between the public
advocate and the Mayor's Office and will most likely be resolved in the end
by the courts.m2
Notwithstanding these obstacles, the office has continued to investigate
problems in City government. The public advocate has a skilled research
staff which identifies problems-many flagged by complaints to the
ombudsman unit or in meetings with community groups. During Mark
Green's first term four-and-a-half years in office, he issued 115 reports,
including in-depth studies of major City policy and budget matters and
investigations of bureaucratic bungling, corruption,' inefficiency, and

mayoral policy toward the public advocate in Green v. Safir, 664 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1997), aff'd as modified, 679 N.Y.S.2d 383 (App. Div. 1998). A unanimous

appellate division agreed with the lower court's ruling that the public advocate is entitled
to review the requested documents to fulfill the public advocate's official functions. The
Giuliani policy of challenging the right of other officials and news media to obtain
information through FOIL has been rejected by the courts in several cases, including Lewis
v. Giuliani, Index No. 116214/96 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, Apr. 21, 1997); Messinger v.
Giuliani, Index No. 402236/97 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, Aug. 11, 1997); New York Times
Co. v. City of New York, 673 N.Y.S.2d 569 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1998); and Criscitello

v. Giuliani, Index No. 105621 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1998).
222. The dispute between the public advocate and the mayor over the intent and
meaning of the public advocate's Charter powers was decided in Green's favor. In Green
v. Safir, 664 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1997), Justice Edward Lehner granted
the public advocate's Article 78 petition challenging the police commissioner's refusal to
permit the Public Advocate's Office to review (with names redacted) records of the police
department's handling of substantiated complaints of police abuse referred by the Civilian
Complaint Review Board ("CCRB"). The public advocate requested the review because
of the many complaints about police misconduct and the CCRB's own data, which showed
between 30% and 50% of substantiated complaints resulted in no disciplinary action by the
New York police department. See NEW YORK CITY CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD,
Jan.-Dec. 1995, VOL. III, No. 2, at 29; NEW YORK CITY
CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD, SEMIANNUAL STATUS REPORT, January-June 1996,
VOL. IV, No. 1, at 51; NEW YORK CITY CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD,
SEMIANNUAL STATUS REPORT, January-December 1996, VOL. IV, No. 2, at 47; see also
NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A FOURTH ANNIVERSARY OVERVIEW OF THE CIVILIAN
COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD, JULY 5, 1993-JULY 5, 1997, at 9. The appellate division
unanimously affirmed the lower court decision and modified the ruling to grant the public
advocate's counsel attorneys' fees. On Dec. 22, 1998, the appellate division denied
Commissioner Safir's motion to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.
223. Green's office has referred numerous matters to the Department of Investigation,
and a few to the United States Attorney or an appropriate district attorney. Unfortunately,
the DOI is unnecessarily and inappropriately secretive about the conclusions of its
investigations, and has never notified the public advocate of the results of any of the matters
referred. In Lewis v. Giuliani, brought by the Daily News, the court ruled against the
DOI's refusal to report on its work, but the practice has not improved, at least with respect
to the Public Advocate's Office. See Lewis v. Giuliani, Index No. 116214/96 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County, Apr. 21, 1997).
SEMIANNUAL STATUS REPORT,
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squandering of public funds. These included, among others, extensive
reports on:
224
" the City's denial of assistance to (a) desperate homeless families,

(b) low-income elderly people seeking rent increase exemptions,'

or mentally ill adults needing protective
and (c) disabled
6
services;2
"

licensing
the City's arcane and poorly enforced procedures for 22
7
work;
shoddy
and
costs
high
resulting
the
and
plumbers

* poor training, testing, and supervision in the City's lifeguard
program;22s
" favoritism and lack of standards in granting government contracts
for everything ranging from food for foster care programs 229 to
contracts for services to immigrants;" 0
the Human Resource
* interfering with democracy:
Administration's failure to comply with the federal "Motor Voter

224.

See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, EMERGENCY HOMELESS

HOTLINE: ACCOUNTS OF RESPONSES TO "EMERGENCY" CALLS BY A CALLER IN THE
OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE TO THE DIVISION OF HOMELESS SERVICES EMERGENCY

ASSISTANCE HOTLINE (1995); see also PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
THE HOMELESS SERVICES HOTLINE: WHEN A HOTLINE BECOMES A BRICK WALL

(1996)

(following up on a study that was done one year earlier).
225. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SENIORS ON
HOLD-WAITING FOR SCRIE: PROBLEMS WITH THE SENIOR CITIZEN'S RENT INCREASE
EXEMPTION PROGRAM (SCRIE) AND WAYS TO FIX THEM (1995).
226. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEWYORK, INVESTIGATION OF HRA'S
OFFICE OF PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR ADULTS (PSA) (1996).
227. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, ENFORCEMENT DOWN THE
DRAIN: HOW THE CITY TOLERATES FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF LICENSING LAWS SUPPOSED

Green introduced
TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC FROM ILLEGAL PLUMBING WORK (1996).
comprehensive legislation to improve regulation of the industry. See Introduction302 to
N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE (1998).
228. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION INTO THE PARKS DEPARTMENT LIFEGUARD PROGRAM (1994).
229. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FOOD FIGHT: A
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION ON HOW THE CITY MIS-SPENDS MILLIONS TO FEED "GREEN
MEAT BALLS" AND "GOLDEN APPLES" TO THE HOMELESS AND FOSTER CARE CHILDREN

(1994).
230. See Letter from Mark Green, Public Advocate for the City of New York, to
Diane McGrath-McKechnie, Commissioner, Community Development Agency (Mar. 25,
1996) (on file with author) (requesting information regarding alleged tampering with scores
in rating of proposals for utilizing federal immigration funds).
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Law" 23 1 and the Board of Elections' mishandling of the September
1996 primary, which resulted
232 in the disenfranchisement of
hundreds of Brooklyn voters;
" the City's failure to assist mothers on welfare to locate safe,
affordable child care, 3 or to establish an efficient welfare
bureaucracy equipped to meet its administrative responsibilities
under the federal welfare laws; 4
" the unresponsiveness of City agencies to calls from the public; 235
* the City's failure to study the environmental impact of the Fresh
Kills Landfill; 236 and
* the deadly impact of lead paint in City housing, schools, and day
care centers.
Because of his broad view of the Charter mandate, the public advocate
has focused not only on investigations of mayoral agencies but also on the
various public benefit corporations that receive taxpayer dollars, 23' such as
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 239 the Health and

231. See
CONFIDENCE:

PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, A VOTE OF No
NYC IS VIOLATING THE "MOTOR VOTER LAW" (1995). The public

How

advocate is a prime sponsor with Council member Gifford Miller of Introduction 450 of
1998, which extends the motor-voter law to more City agencies and strengthens the
enforcement mechanisms.
232. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, A PRELIMINARY REPORT
ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 10, 1996 PRIMARY ELECTION IN KINGS COUNTY
(1996).
233. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, WELFARE AND CHILD
CARE: WHAT ABOUT THE CHILDREN? (1997).
234. See PUBLICADVOCATE FORTHE CITY OF NEW YORK, FROM WELFARETO WORK:
GETTING LOST ALONG THE WAY (1997).
235. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HURRY UP AND WAIT: AN
EVALUATION OF HOW NYC AGENCIES RESPOND TO CALLS FOR INFORMATION OR

(1997).
236. See PUBLIC ADVOCATEFORTHE CITYOFNEWYORK, UNHEALTHY CLOSURE: THE

ASSISTANCE

NEED FOR A FULL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON DOS'S LONG-TERM PLAN TO

CONTROL POLLUTION FROM FRESH KILLS (1997).
237. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, LEAD & KIDS: WHY ARE
30,000 NYC CHILDREN CONTAMINATED? (1998).
238. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 52 § 1150(2) (1989) (defining "agency" as an entity

funded in whole or in part from the City treasury).
239. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FORTHE CITY OF NEW YORK, FOLLOWTHEMONEY: How
THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NY AND NJ HAS FAVORED NEW JERSEY OVER NEW YORK (1996)
(documenting how the Port Authority is biased against New York, which generates 60% of
the revenue but receives only 48% of the capital spending).
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Hospitals Corporation,' 4 the Transit Authority, 24' and the Board of
Education, 24 as well as government-regulated industries and programs that
have a major impact on city residents' lives.243
The office focused particular attention between 1994 and 1998 on two
of the thorniest and most costly service delivery systems: health care and
child welfare. In the area of health care, the office issued sixteen major
investigations, including a 160-page, year-long study of and guide to

240. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, AFTERSHOCK: RAPE
SURVIVORS IN HHC EMERGENCY ROOMS (1994) (reporting on how Health and Hospital
Corporation hospitals treat rape survivors, with recommendations for change. A Summer
1996 follow-up study found significant improvements); see also PUBLICADVOCATE FORTHE
CITY OF NEW YORK, FOR WHOM THE "BELL" TOLLS (1994) (investigating the failure of
public and private hospitals to comply with the 1989 state regulations-the "Bell
regulations"-limiting resident hours and working conditions). In 1998, the State finally
took note and began issuing hefty fines against violators.
241. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, UNEASY RIDER: HOW THE
TRANSIT AUTHORITY VIOLATES FEDERAL BUS ACCESSIBILITY RULES (1995) (documenting
how City buses failed to comply with federal laws requiring access for people with
disabilities); see also PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, THE T.A. IS
DRAGGING ITS FEET ON SUBWAY DRAGGINGS (1995) (documenting the T.A.'s failure to
implement its own task force's 1988 safety recommendations to reduce subway draggings).
In April 1998, the public advocate also filed an administrative complaint with the Federal
Transit Authority, alleging that the Metropolitan Transportation Authority ("MTA") and the
Transit Authority are violating the Americans With Disabilities Act by denying disabled
paratransit riders services comparable to public transportation. See Richard Weir, No Easy
Ridefor Disabled,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1998, § 14, at 7. In December 1998, the MTA
announced that it would spend significant funds to correct the primary problem identified
in the public advocate's federal complaint. See James Rutenberg, TA Maps Upgrades,
DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Dec. 3, 1998, at 4.
242. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CONSTRUCTION VS.
CHILDREN: THE NEED TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY DURING RENOVATION OF
SCHOOLS AND PUBLIC HOUSING (1996) (reporting on safety problems in Housing Authority
and Board of Education construction projects).
243. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMPETITION IN
SANITATION: HOW TO REDUCE COSTS AND IMPROVE SERVICE FOR BUSINESSES AND

RESIDENCES (1994) (proposing to end the "mob tax" in the private carting industry); PUBLIC
ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, THE POOR PAY MORE ...FOR LESS (1994)
(reporting on how banks have abandoned poor neighborhoods and have been replaced by
expensive check-cashing services); PUBLICADVOCATEFORTHE CITY OF NEW YORK, DON'T
BANK ON US: TELLER MACHINE AVAILABILITY AND BANK BRANCH HOURS INURBAN NEW
YORK (1994) (documenting the absence of automated teller machines, weekend hours, and
bank branches in low-income neighborhoods and proposing the installation of automated
teller machines at police stations to improve security). City Hall agreed with the proposal
but, as of the date of this writing, has not taken steps to implement it.
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HMOs, 24two detailed exposes of how HMO's override doctors'
prescription choices;245 a comprehensive demographic and statistical study
of New Yorkers without health insurance; 246 two detailed investigations of
the serious health hazards of dry cleaning emissions in residential buildings
in the City; 247 a comprehensive consumer guide to New York City's public

and private hospitals; 241 an expos6 of nursing homes' poor compliance with
public disclosure requirements regarding their health and safety records; 249
an analysis of the State's poor enforcement of nursing home standards of
care; 25° and a study of the legal barriers to holding HMOs responsible for
medical decisions." In June 1997, the office won an important legal
victory when a judge ruled that the State Department of Health is required
to turn over statistical data on adverse incidents in public and private
hospitals.5 2

244. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, WHAT AILS HMOs-A
CONSUMER DIAGNOSIS AND Rx (1996). The office has done several related studies of
problems in I-MOs. See, e.g., PUBLIC ADVOCATE FORTHE CITY OF NEW YORK, Two LISTS:

COMMERCIAL AND MEDICAID MANAGED CARE PROVIDERS (1995) (reporting on how six
leading HMOs discriminate against Medicaid patients by limiting their choice of doctors to
a smaller, separate list); PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, MANAGED
CONFUSION: How HMO MARKETING MATERIALS ARE TRICKING THE ELDERLY AND THE

POOR (1995).
245. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMPROMISING YOUR
DRUG OF CHOICE: How HMOs ARE DICTATING YOUR NEXT PRESCRIPTION (1996).
See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FORTHE CITY OF NEW YORK, WHO ARETHE UNINSURED?
ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, WHO WILL TAKE CARE
OF MOM? WHO WILLTAKE CARE OF ME?: THE NEW YORK STATE PARTNERSHIP FOR LONG246.

(1997); see also PUBLIC

TERM CAREDOES NOT DELIVERONITS PROMISES (1995) (reporting on the private long-term
care program endorsed by the State).
247. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CLOTHED IN
CONTROVERSY: THE RISK TO NEW YORKERS FROM DRY CLEANING EMISSIONS AND WHAT
CAN BE DONEABOUTIT (1994); PUBLICADVOCATE FORTHE CITY OFNEW YORK, CLOTHED
IN CONTROVERSY II: THE URGENT NEED TO PROTECT NEW YORKERS FROM TOXIC DRY
CLEANING FUMES (1997).
248. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, THE CONSUMER GUIDE TO

NEW YORK CITY HOSPITALS (1997).

The publication took more than a year to produce.

It includes a handbook with detailed explanations of the indicators listed in the report, a

separate guide for the hospitals in each major area of the City, and a comparative analysis
of the factors to consider in locating the best hospital. Id.
249. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, NURSING HOME SAFETY:
THE HIDDEN REPORT CARD (1998).
250. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, RESIDENTS AT RISK: THE
COLLAPSE OF NURSING HOME ENFORCEMENT IN NEW YORK CITY (1998).
251. See PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, No DAY IN COURT: How
HMOs IN NEW YORK ESCAPE LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR CONDUCT (1998).

252.
4, 1997).

See Green v. DeBuono, No. 1746-97, mem. op. (Sup. Ct. Albany County, June
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The office has also focused on child welfare. 53 In cooperation with CPLAN," which analyzes problems in the child welfare system based on the
pattern of complaints of those who seek its assistance, the public advocate
issued several studies of problems in the City and State child welfare
bureaucracies."5
All of the public advocate's studies 2 6 contain extensive
recommendations for change, and, in many instances, the advice has been
followed. 57

253. In April 1997, C-PLAN held a conference in cooperation with Fordham
University Stein Center for Ethics and Public Interest Law, Startingfrom Scratch, in which
leading researchers and practitioners in the child welfare field explored ways to improve the
system.
254. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text (describing C-PLAN).
255. See BEYOND ELISA's LAW: THE NEXT STEPS (1996) (proposing a twelve-step
"Agenda for Safer Children"; issued with Comptroller Alan Hevesi, Assembly member
Roger Green, and Council member Stephen DiBrienza); C-PLAN ANALYSIS: INDIVIDUAL
AND SYSTEMATICADVOCACY (1995) (analyzing complaints received and troublesome trends

in service delivery);

CREATING A CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM FORTHE21ST CENTURY (1996)

(listing recommendations for the new Administration for Children's Services ); CUTS THAT
CO$TII: CHILD WELFAREPROGRAMS (1995) (discussing early predictions of the likely fiscal

and social impact of the governor's and mayor's proposed $237 million in cuts to childwelfare programs); see also ANNUAL REVIEW OF NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES CHILD FATALITY REPORTS (1996); SECOND ANNUAL REVIEW (1996);

THIRD ANNUALREVIEW (1997) (analyzing reports on child fatalities by the New York State
Department of Social Services); CHILD WELFARE SCORECARD (1998) (providing a
comprehensive look at how the system has fared since 1995).
256. All of the reports have been deposited in the Municipal Reference Library,
indexed under "Public Advocate."
257. For example: (1) C-PLAN's January 1996 recommendation that a separate
agency be created to deal with child-welfare issues was adopted by the mayor shortly
thereafter with the announcement of the creation of the Administration for Children's
Services; (2) the public advocate's August 1996 recommendation to the mayor and the state
attorney general that they sue the tobacco companies for tobacco-induced Medicaid costs
was adopted by the mayor in October 1996 and former Attorney General Vacco a few
months later; (3) in January 1997, the public advocate successfully urged the Federal
Reserve Board to withdraw a proposal to give banks an extra day to credit customers'
accounts for deposits of local checks; (4) citing safety and fiscal problems in other
jurisdictions, the public advocate joined state legislators in a successful effort to persuade
the mayor not to privatize City jails and prisons; (5) an inspection of the Frederick Douglass
Houses in March 1994 by the public advocate uncovered asbestos in gaping holes; following
a meeting with 500 tenants, the New York City Housing Authority accepted responsibility
and agreed to take corrective measures; (6) the public advocate's expos6 on hospital
violations of the "Bell Regulations" led to stepped up enforcement by the Department of
Health. See supra note 240.
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4. Citizen Access
The public advocate has focused on ideas and suggestions from
communities as well as individual complainants. Calling the office "a
socket for citizens to plug into," Green has tried to link his own
bureaucracy to his constituents. He designed the staffing and scheduling
of the office not only to receive complaints at the central location, by phone
and in person, but also to make the office's information and services
available to people in their homes and neighborhoods. This was
accomplished through several mechanisms:
a. Public Information
In 1995 the Office published The People's Green Book, 1995-1996:
Your Guide to New York City Government Services, a user-friendly guide
organized by type of service rather than agency name (as found in the
standard City-issued GreenBook), and A People's Guide to New York City
Agency Publications, a survey of the materials available from City
agencies. The Public Advocate's Office was the first City agency to go
online when it established an e-mail address 8 and a Web page 9 in April
1995. The Web site was credited by New York Magazine as "The Best of
New York" 2" and in May 1997, in conjunction with the Baruch College
School of Public Affairs, the Public Advocate's Office announced the
establishment of a public policy discussion area attached to its Web site.
"Vox New York: A Public Policy Forum for the City" is designed to

258. The office's e-mail address is <mgreen@pubadvocate.gov>.
259. The web site homepage can be accessed at <http://www.pubadvocate.
nyc.gov/- advocate/index.html>.

260. See Sarah Bernard et al., The Best ofNew York, N. Y. MAG., Apr. 14, 1997, at
109.
Mark Green's New York City Public Advocate's Home Page .

.. ,

a virtual

advertisement for the man's Good Government virtuousness, does deliver. While
this well-organized site never lets you forget that the PA's office is a bastion of
civic benevolence, we can think of no better place to find out everything you need
to navigate the thicket of the city bureaucracy. Noisy neighbors? Suckered by
a fly-by-night electronics store? Streetlight out on your block? This searchable
cyber version of the Green Book (an occasionally updated compendium that's
hard to get your hands on) delivers, with just a few mouse clicks, the goods-the

names of the appropriate city agencies and commissioners, their phone numbers,
plus sundry advice on the best ways to seek redress for your ills.
Id. at 109-10 (first emphasis omitted).
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encourage New Yorkers to become more informed about important
legislative
and public policy issues and to join in online discussions of
261
them.
In 1996, 1997, and 1998, the Public Advocate's Office co-sponsored,
along with the national "Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids," special school
events designed to discourage young teenagers from smoking. Green's
April 15, 1997, national "Kick Butts Day, 262 was broadcast by closed
circuit from Hudde Junior High School in Brooklyn to an estimated 2
million youth in conjunction with events in 75 cities and towns. President
Clinton, who has made teens and tobacco one of the priorities of his
administration, joined the public advocate in addressing the students.2 63
b. Community Outreach
Providing information services is one way to communicate what is
going on in the City and to learn what concerns people. Going to
neighborhoods is another. During his first term, Green held a Town Hall
meeting in each of the City's 59 community board districts. These Town
Halls were cable-cast citywide by Crosswalks, New York City's
government-operated cable TV station. Co-sponsored by local elected
officials, the meetings drew between 75 and 125 participants. Public
Advocate staff with particular areas of expertise attended the meetings to
field questions and follow up on specific complaints. In the great American

261. Vox New York can be accessed at <http://www.baruch.
cuny.edu/voxnewyork>.
262. Kick Butts Day is sponsored by the Public Advocate's Office in collaboration
with the Accountability Project. See supra note 217.
263. The President, in his speech to the teens, stressed the essential features of the
office:
I want you to think about Mark Green's title a minute .... Mark Green's title

is the public advocate. I don't know if there's another city in America that has
an elected public advocate. But think about what that means. What would it
mean for you to be a public advocate? Someone who is standing up for people
at large, right? For the public. Now, it was in that connection that Mark Green
created this day, Kick Butts Day, all across the United States.
President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks on Kick Butts Day in Brooklyn, New York,
supra note 1.
In conclusion, the President explained to the students that, in his job, he was "sort of
the country's public advocate." Id.
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tradition of "town halls," the meetings often became open-ended (and
264
unpredictable) forums where people spoke their minds about government.
The Public Advocate's Office also organizes special events focused on
particular issues or constituencies, including Federal-City Budget and
Legislative Briefings, 265a forum in December 1994 on the impact of budget
cuts on the Latino Community, an annual Gay and Lesbian Pride Award
Event, and "Shop & Vote" campaigns to register voters at shopping
locations.266 In addition, the office established five special units to work
with local community activists and concerned residents to address and
correct local problems. These so-called Citizen Action Teams ("CAT"),
located in the Rockaways, the Northeast Bronx, Bay Ridge, the South
Bronx, and Harlem, grapple with a whole host of neighborhood issues
including health care delivery, police brutality, job training, and public
safety.
5. The "Charter Cop" Role
In this capacity, the public advocate joined with the petitioners in the
landmark case that forced the mayor and the City Council to establish and
fund the Independent Budget Office-an agency designated in the 1989
Charter to provide independent fiscal analyses of the City budgets and
expenditure and revenue projections .267 Green is also a plaintiff in a

264. Each year, the office schedules a few town hall meetings during the daytime at
senior centers, since many seniors do not attend evening meetings. In August 1995, Mayor
Giuliani-working with the commissioners of the Department for the Aging ("DFTA") and
the New York City Housing Authority-attempted to bar the public advocate from holding
these meetings. The mayor charged falsely that the events were "partisan" and thus barred
by federal, state, and city laws governing public housing and programs for seniors. After
ten prominent civil liberties attorneys wrote a letter of protest to the mayor, and the public
advocate threatened to sue, the DFTA quietly reversed itself. The senior center town hall
meetings, and other such meetings, proceeded without incident thereafter.
265. The forums were held in October 1994 at City Hall and September 1996 at the
U.S. Customs House. Speakers included staff from federal agencies and the City
Congressional delegation.
266. The campaigns were held in June of 1996 and 1997 in 700 New York City
supermarkets, record stores, and bookstores in collaboration with the New York City Board
of Education, the Food Industry Alliance of New York State, and the United Food and
Commercial Workers Union.
267. Both the Dinkins and Giuliani administrations declined to fund the Independent
Budget Office ("IBO"), which provoked a five-year legal battle led by the New York Public
Interest Research Group. See New York Pub. Interest Research Group v. Dinkins, 83
N.Y.2d 377 (1994). As one of the officials responsible under the Charter for appointing
the IBO Advisory Board and the director, City Council President Andrew Stein initially was
named as a respondent in the suit brought in 1991. After Mark Green took office, he
petitioned the court for permission to switch sides in the lawsuit. He joined the petitioners
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lawsuit filed in April 1998 by the IBO against Mayor Giuliani for
interfering

with the IBO's work by systematically

information.268

withholding

Green also weighed in with amicus curiae briefs on several important
"constitutional" disputes over the powers of the mayor under the 1989
Charter. In 1994, the public advocate supported the City Council's
interpretation of its power to amend the mayor's proposed mid-year budget
modifications. 269 The following year, Green supported the Council's effort
to establish an Independent Police Investigation and Audit Board.270 In
1997, the public advocate joined Borough Presidents Ruth Messinger and
Fernando Ferrer on amicus briefs in the U.S. District Court and the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals opposing the mayor's decision to permit
commercial programming by Fox News Network and Bloomberg News on
New York City's government-access cable channels. 27' In a similar vein,
the public advocate's most recent significant effort to uphold the drafters'
intent is his own lawsuit, 2' Green v. Safir, in which Green challenged the
Police Department's refusal to permit him to review redacted records of the
department's handling of substantiated complaints of police misconduct
referred by the Civilian Complaint Review Board.
Green also submitted an amicus letter brief urging the court to deny the
administration's request for the sealing of three independent reviews of the
performance of the Administration for Children's Services. The court

(as did Borough Presidents Ruth Messinger and Fernando Ferrer) and played a leading role
in the final legal strategy that resulted in a victory for petitioners. In November 1995, the
court ordered an expedited schedule for choosing an Advisory Board and a director, and the
public advocate's staff spearheaded the process. In February 1996, Douglas A. Criscitello
was appointed the first director of this office, which has issued several highly regarded
fiscal analyses.
268. See Criscitello v. Giuliani, Index No. 105621/98 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1998).
The court granted plaintiffs summary judgment at oral argument on Dec. 17, 1998.
269. See Council of New York v. Giuliani, 621 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1994).
270. See Mayor of New York v. Council of New York, No. 402354, 95-001, 95-003,
1995 WL478872 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1995), aff'dmem., 651 N.Y.S.2d 531 (App. Div.
1997), lv. to app'l denied, Slip. Op. Mo. No. 232 (May 6, 1997). The Council lost this
case and the one over the budget modification process, but the legal disputes raised
important questions about the balance of power in the 1989 Charter.
271.

The District Court's decision in Time Warner Cable v. City of New York, 943 F.

Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), enjoining the mayor's action, was affirmed by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals on July 3, 1997. See Time Warner Cable v. Bloomberg, 118 F.3d
917 (2d Cir. 1997).
272. The trial court ruled in Green's favor on October 14, 1997. See Green v. Safir,
664 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1997), aff'd as modified, 679 N.Y.S.2d 383
(App. Div. 1998).
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ruled that the City could not keep the studies secret.2 ' And in September
1998 the public advocate submitted an amicus brief supporting the City's
Council's legal challenge to the validity of proceedings of the Charter
Revision Commission appointed by Mayor Giuliani to bump the Council's
proposed referendum on Yankee Stadium.274
6. Pension Trustee
This is an important part of the public advocate's historic role as one
of the three citywide elected officials and is codified in City law.27 Green
has used his vote on the NYCERS board to press for improved
management of the NYCERS system and responsible use of the pension
In view of the extreme
funds for economically targeted investments.
volatility of tobacco stock and its vulnerability to new and restrictive
regulations and tort liability, beginning in May 1997, Green began urging
his fellow trustees to move toward divestment of NYCERS' $360 million
holdings in that industry.27 6 The public advocate also cast the deciding vote
in 1996 in favor of "corpus funding," i.e., to fund NYCERS'
administrative operations from the corpus of the pensions funds-which the
trustees control-rather than from the mayor's executive budget. Severe
mayoral budget cuts in the past had led to insufficient staffing and serious
backlogs in processing member and retiree applications. The proposal was
adopted that year by the state legislature.
In sum, the Public Advocate's Office has a limited Charter mandate,
a very small budget, a powerful adversary who keeps a tight rein on the
executive agencies, and no line authority to compel change. Despite these
obstacles, an aggressive and creative "people's advocate" can do a great
deal with these limited powers to reform public policy and to fulfill the
1989 Charter Revision Commission's expectation that it serve as a vox
populi.

273. See Marisol A. v. Giuliani, No. 95 Civ. 10533, 1997 WL 630183 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (mem. decision).
274. See Council of New York v. Giuliani, No. 2496, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS
11001 (Oct. 16, 1998).
275. See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 13-103(b)(2) (1994).
276. In June 1998, the trustees voted to freeze tobacco holdings in NYCERS' passive
portfolios.
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IV. THE HONOR AND THE CURSE OF BEING AN ELECTED OMBUDSMAN:
LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE OFFICE

As columnist Murray Kempton wisely predicted in 1975 when Paul
O'Dwyer became the City's first ombudsman, being an elected ombudsman
is both an honor and a curse. 2' It is an honor because it is a citywide
elected position to which tens of thousands of New Yorkers turn each year
for help and to which numerous politicians aspire. It is a curse, however,
because of the fierce resistance of the executive agencies to the
ombudsman's mandate and the limited powers provided by the Charter to
change government policy.
The theme running through the battles in New York City and elsewhere
over the past several decades was how to create a truly effective,
independent ombudsman that other appointed and elected officials will
accept as a legitimate oversight body and complaint-handling agency. The
dominant view, propounded by the Bar Association and all the ombudsman
scholars was that the ombudsman should not be elected or aspire to elective
office because the taint of electoral politics necessarily would undermine
the ombudsman's usefulness and credibility.
We respectfully disagree. In the real world, the mandate to oversee
and investigate mayoral agencies has inescapable political overtones, no
matter how "above the fray" the ombudsman may wish to be. Serving as
a check on the official exercise of power is fundamentally a political
process (even if not a partisan one), and the ombudsman cannot be both
insular and effective. If the ombudsman is doing a good job, toes will be
stepped on.
No little-known appointee, especially if ultimately accountable to
politicians-be it a mayor or a City Council-can have the impact or
effectiveness of one who is elected citywide and hence accountable to the
public. The battles in New York City during the 1960s and 1970s prove the
case. The fear of establishing an office that would favor one faction, party,
or political institution over another paralyzed the legislators and rendered
them unable to create any effective system for redressing citizen
complaints. In the end, none of the carefully crafted proposals to create an
"independent" appointed ombudsman of "high stature" allayed the fears of
the elected officials about the potential for political competition and
reduction in their own power.
New York City was not alone in this respect. Most ombudsman offices
created during that period were either executive ombudsmen, and thus

277.

See Kempton, supra note 102.
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insufficiently independent, 278 or legislatively appointed ombudsmen who
maintained a relatively low public profile. The reports issued by these
offices indicate that most of the work focuses on resolving individual
complaints. Some ombudsman offices also initiate reviews of agencies
with repeated patterns of complaints and attempt to correct them through
quiet advocacy.27 9 The Iowa ombudsman, for example, reports that it
initiates a separate investigation when it discovers that a complaint
evidences a systemic problem or general practice or policy warranting more
extensive review. 8 On occasion, that office makes recommendations for
change, proposes legislation or monitors the agency's response to the
criticisms.
It appears, however, that none of the governmental ombudsmen are in
a position to issue extensive and hard-hitting investigative research and
whistle-blowing reports like those prepared by the Public Advocate's
Office. In part, this is because none of those other ombudsman offices
evolved in the unique way that New York's ombudsman did-as a player
on the political scene for over a century-and in part it is because they must
avoid excessively antagonizing the officials who appointed them, even
One of the most powerful
when they have set terms of office. 8
ombudsman offices created over the past two decades-the New Jersey
Department of the Public Advocate-was highly effective and pro-active,
but ultimately fell victim to the political wars. Established by state law in
1974 as a cabinet-level department, the office was eliminated entirely in
January 1994, when the Republicans won control of both the statehouse and
the legislature.28 2

278. See EXECUTIVE OMBUDSMEN INTHE UNITED STATES, supra note 6, at 2. Alan
J. Wyner notes that the "clear disadvantage" of the executive ombudsman is that his
"allegiance to the person who appointed him may prevent him from assuming an impartial
attitude when investigating complaints that may prove damaging to the chief executive."
Id.
279. Some good examples are contained in the annual reports issued by the
ombudsmen of Puerto Rico and Hawaii. The ombudsman of Puerto Rico, Dr. R. Adolfo
de Castro, has made an interesting proposal to extend his jurisdiction to cover "any
business, enterprise or person . . . contracted by the State to provide services to the
citizenry or that has acquired from the State a majority interest over the public entity which

formerly provided those services." R.

ADOLFO DE CASTRO, THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE

PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES 2 (Aug. 6, 1997) (emphasis omitted) (on file

with the New York Law School Law Review).
280. See Letter from Duncan C. Fowler, Deputy Citizens' Aide/Ombudsman of Iowa,
to Laurel W. Eisner, General Counsel for the Public Advocate of the City of New York
(Apr. 28, 1995) (on file with author).
281. See ZAGORIA, supra note 51, ch. 4.
282. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27E-31 (West 1982-1983) (repealed 1994). For a history
of the department and its powers, see Martin A. Bierbaum, On the Frontiers of Public

InterestLaw: The New Jersey State Departmentofthe PublicAdvocate-the PublicInterest
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That is why the New York City public advocate's position as an elected
ombudsman, established by popular referendum in the City Charter, is the
better model.2 83 Without the popular mandate provided by an election, it
would be far harder, if not impossible, to stand up to a mayor predictably
annoyed by someone overseeing his performance.
The fact that the public advocate is elected rather than appointed
strengthens the public advocate's position in disputes with the mayor. The
elective nature of the position also sparks the interest of both the public and
the media in the office's work. As an elected official, the public advocate
can use the office as a bully pulpit, which is the office's most important
tool for making an impact-far more important than the power found in the
technical language of the Charter. This was true of Paul O'Dwyer, Carol
Bellamy, and Andrew Stein, and it has been true of Mark Green.
When the voters elect a public advocate by a strong majority, the
public advocate's pulpit power carries greater strength.2 84 Public support
is critical to the office's ability to make positive changes in City
government.285 It means that bureaucrats take notice when the office calls
and consider possible press exposure when they resist the office's efforts.
They realize that the public advocate may use access to the electorate and
the media to expose their errors.
As H.L. Mencken aptly said:
"Conscience is the sense that someone may be watching."2 86 That, after
all, is the raison d'gtre of the office.
Bernard Richland, who had served as City corporation counsel, often
provided the historical view during the 1989 Charter Revision Commission
deliberations. On the subject of the elected ombudsman, he noted that he
wrote the bill O'Dwyer introduced into the Council for an appointive
ombudsman.
It was received by the Council with hollow silence, and nothing
happened to it.

Advocacy Division, 13 SETON HALL L. REV. 475 (1983). Bierbaum foresaw the dangers
to the office in his 1983 article, noting the legislature could abolish it at any time, and, in
addition, that the public advocate himself served at the pleasure of the governor and was
thus vulnerable to political pressure. See id. at 489.
283. Unlike the New Jersey office, the Public Advocate's Office cannot be eliminated
except by referendum of the voters.
284. Mark Green received 60% of the vote in 1993 and 73% in 1997.
285. 1989 Charter Revision Commission Members Schwarz, Richland, Betanzos,
Gourdine, and Leventhal expressly noted that the power of the office comes from having
been independently elected to stand in criticism of the mayor. See Public Meeting, May 6,
1989, at 198; Public Meeting, May 13, 1989, at 303.
286. Michael Moncur, Michael Moncur's Collection of Quotations (visited Dec. 4,
1998) <http://www.starlingtech.com/quotes/qsearch.cgi>.
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It wasn't until O'Dwyer became Council President and a member
of the Board of Estimate, with real power that he was able to do
something .... He did a splendid job of keeping tabs on what the
Mayoral
bureaucracy was up to, what kind of mischief was going
287
on.

Richland was right. 288 Without the threat of public exposure, 28 9 agency
bureaucracies would be less concerned about the public advocate's
findings. 2' The glare of publicity has benefitted the public and proven
Justice Brandeis'
axiom that "[s]unlight is said to be the best of
29
disinfectants.

,

1

Despite the original skepticism about the value of the office, by the end
of Green's first term as public advocate, the office had fulfilled the
mandate created by the 1989 Commission. Green used the hybrid nature
of the office and its lack of line administrative authority not as a limitation
but as a license to investigate and innovate in pursuit of more democratic
and user-friendly government.
During the 1993 electoral campaign, when six candidates sought the
party nominations for the office, several commentators predicted that "once
the first Public Advocate proves the value of the job .... the City Council
2 2
leadership

and

the Mayor

will stop

trying

to eliminate

it."

Unfortunately, this prediction has not yet come true. Although the office's
services have been in heavy demand by the public, and its reports have
received wide public notice, the office is not safe from attack by those
annoyed by its independence and its critiques.
In June 1998, Mayor Giuliani appointed a Charter Revision
Commission to block the City Council from placing a referendum on the

287. Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 199.
288. He spoke strongly in favor of retaining the office in the new Charter, but he
believed that "the ombudsman position works only if you have power, independent power
." Id. at 200.

289. Commissioner Gourdine articulated the point well when he said that the political
ambition of the officeholder keeps a constant spotlight on his or her policies. See supra
note 135 and accompanying text.
290. The accident of politics that brought Green into office as a Democrat during the
administration of a Republican mayor may have intensified the conflict, but Green's role
would be hardly different in a Democratic administration. He promised during the 1993
campaign for the job to "blow the whistle when a mayoral agency is falling short." Sam
Roberts, It's More Dian Words: Race In Election Year, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1993, at B2.
Many of the problems the office has exposed have been longstanding and have cut across
both Republican and Democratic administrations.
291.

Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT

89 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1995).
292. See Bennett, supra note 210.
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November 1998 ballot on whether to move Yankee Stadium from the Bronx
to Manhattan. 293 Before holding a single public meeting, the twelvemember Commission, comprised largely of the mayor's close colleagues
and political supporters, 294 announced its interest in eliminating the Public
Advocate's Office, as well as the other mayoral oversight agency which has
criticized the mayor, the Independent Budget Office. 2I
The Commission met with a barrage of criticism and within two weeks
dropped both of these ideas. The Commission was responding to harsh
press reports and opposition from many community organizations, good
government groups, and ordinary New Yorkers. The New York Times ran
an editorial supporting the office's retention: "Some City Hall officials
want the commission to shut down the advocate's office and the
Independent Budget Office entirely. Both provide independent assessments
that are burrs under the Mayor's powerful mantle, institutional reason
enough to keep them both alive."296 Fritz Schwarz reiterated his belief in
the office designed by the 1989 Commission that he had chaired.2 97
Additionally, many private citizens and advocacy groups sent in powerful
testaments to the value of the Public Advocate's Office.298

293. Under New York Municipal Home Rule Law section 36(5)(e), a Charter
amendment placed on the ballot by a mayoral charter revision commission automatically
preempts any referendum initiated by the City Council or by citizen petition.
294. The New York Times opined that the commission appointed by the mayor was
"stacked... with his cronies...." Editorial, A Rush to CharterRevision, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 1998, at A22.
295. See generally Letter from Peter Powers, Chairman, 1998 New York City Charter
Revision Commission (June 19, 1998) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review)
(This Powers Commission letter went to hundreds of people, usually addressed as "Dear
Friend." It stated that the functions of City offices including the public advocate would be
reviewed by the Charter Revision Commission).
296. Editorial, A Rush to CharterRevision, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1998, at A22.
297. Mr. Schwarz wrote: "Nor should you recommend the elimination of independent
offices such as the Public Advocate and the Independent Budget Office that, among other
things, serve as a check on and balance to the enormous powers of the mayoralty and its
huge bureaucracy." Letter from Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Cravath, Swaine & Moore,
to Peter Powers, Chairman, 1998 New York City Charter Revision Commission 6 (June 29,
1998) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review). Schwarz's comment was
contained in a seven-page critique of the 1998 Charter Revision Commission's lack of
representativeness, lack of independence, and poor processes. See id.
298. A Queens resident wrote: "Please do not abandon the people. Please do not take
away our only course of action when we have problems with bureaucracies-and can't
afford legal fees or larger contributions to people in office. It gives us a great sense of
security and peace of mind to know that there is a Public Advocate in government looking
out for, and defending, the 'little people' of New York City." A letter from a Manhattan
resident praised the public advocate's annual Ranking Banking surveys. The Urban Justice
Center opined: "The office of the Public Advocate offers one of the most effective voices
for the forgotten and disenfranchised in the City." Letter from Douglas Lasdon, Executive
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On August 20, the Commission issued its final report, which contained
a much scaled-down series of modest campaign-finance reform proposals
for the ballot, some of which did not require a referendum or Charter
revision. The report describes the Commission's change of opinion about
the Public Advocate's Office:
The Commission considered amending Charter § 24 to eliminate
the Office of Public Advocate. The Public Advocate, formerly
known as the Council president, had been retained by the 1989
Charter Revision Commission by a split vote ....

Nonetheless,

a number of people testified at the public hearing in favor of
retaining the Public Advocate. The office seems to be functioning
well for some New Yorkers who could not otherwise find help in
resolving bureaucratic problems. The Public Advocate's election
by a citywide electorate apparently strengthens the office's ability
to help individual citizens resolve problems that are perhaps
unsolvable by a City Council member representing a smaller
district. The Commission, therefore, unanimously resolved at the
July 16, 1998, meeting to continue studying whether the City
Council or another City official or agency could be as effective a
trouble shooter for New Yorkers. 2"
It is evident from the events of 1998 that despite the office's long
history, its successes in recent years, and its meager budget, as long as the
public advocate continues to function as a thorn in the bureaucracy's side,
challenges to its existence are likely to re-emerge from time to time. 300
There is also reason to believe that it will survive the attacks as it has for
167 years.
It would be worthwhile some time in the future, however, to correct
three serious structural limitations that impede the ability of any occupant
of the office to accomplish his or her goals in the most efficient manner:

Director of Urban Justice Center, to the 1998 New York City Charter Revision Commission
(June 30, 1998). According to the National Committee to Prevent Child Abuse, the public
advocate's child welfare ombudsman project, C-Plan, "provides an essential and
tremendously valuable service." Letter from Christine S. Deyss, Associate Director of the
National Committee to Prevent Child Abuse, to Jane Golden, of C-PLAN (June 24, 1998).
In a poignant version of the letters the office receives on a regular basis, even without a
Charter crisis, one Brooklyn resident wrote to the Commission: "I'd like to tell you about
how the Public Advocate's office saved my life." (June 30, 1998).
299. N.Y. CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, Aug. 20, 1998, at 35.
300. The Daily News, which covers many of the office's studies, has repeatedly
printed editorials attacking the office. See, e.g., Editorial, Advocate This, Mark Green,

DAILY NEws (N.Y.), Feb. 18, 1997, at 30.
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(1) The absence of subpoena power: At the very least, the public
advocate needs a clearly defined mechanism to compel compliance with
requests for information under Charter section 24(j). No administration,
however right-minded, will happily open its books to an institutional
auditor unless there are sanctions for refusing to do so. The Giuliani
Administration, in fact, has elevated the practice of withholding
information from actual or potential critics to the level of a policy and does
not hide the fact that it does so intentionally.30 '
(2) The absence ofa fixed bottom line in the budget: Without a fixed
budget, the public advocate is at the mercy of the very official whose
agencies he must, by law, investigate, as well as the City Council, which
may regard him as a rival for attention.' °2
(3) The lack of access to independent legal advice: The public
advocate (and the City Council, the comptroller and the borough
presidents) do not have access to independent counsel from the City Law
Department, because the corporation counsel is appointed by the mayor and
serves at the mayor's pleasure. 3 3 None of these other elected officials, has
the benefit of the hundreds of lawyers on the corporation counsel's staff
mayor decides, in his discretion, to champion the other official's
unless 3the
4
cause. 0

301.

See supra note 221 and accompanying text; see also Clyde Haberman, Once

Again the Mayor Hogs the Ball, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1998, at B1.

302. Speaker Peter Vallone has protected the Public Advocate's Office from the worst
blows of the mayor's budget ax, but the office's dependence on the outcome of negotiations
between the mayor and the Council creates inappropriate limits on its ability to function
independently. See supra note 220 and accompanying text (discussing the conflicts between
Mayor Giuliani and Public Advocate Green over the size of the office's budget). There also
may come a time when a hostile mayor and City Council will agree to sharply reduce the
public advocate's budget. One legal safeguard against any excessive cut in the budget is
the requirement in the City Charter text that only a popular referendum can "abolish[ ],
transfer [ or curtail[ ]" the power of the office. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 38(5)
(1989).
303. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 17 § 391 (1989), establishes the law department to be
headed by a corporation counsel, but does not, in fact, expressly state that the corporation
counsel shall be appointed by the mayor. The mayor's power here apparently is inferred
from his power under New York City Charter, to appoint "all commissioners and all other
officers not elected by the people, except as otherwise provided by law." Id. ch. I § 6.
304. Where these officials disagree with a mayoral agency, they have no source of
independent public legal advice. In April 1997, for example, the Public Advocate's Office
was barred from observing a license-revocation hearing convened by the Taxi and
Limousine Commission. See Letter from Diane McGrath-McKechnie, Commission
Chairperson of the New York City Taxi &Limousine Commission, to Mark Green, Public
Advocate (Apr. 25, 1997). This decision to exclude the public advocate's representative
was contrary to the Charter mandates of the office and clear legal precedent requiring such
proceedings to be open to the public. See Matter of Herald Co. v. Weisenberg, 59 N.Y.2d
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Nor can the public advocate or any of the other non-mayoral officials
go to court without the mayor's approval, 0 5 because the Charter places the
3
corporation counsel in charge of "all the law business of the City.""6
The
courts have long interpreted that provision, and others like it in localities
around the state, as restricting an official's power to appear in court
without corporation counsel, unless the latter has a conflict of interest, e.g.,
where the mayor is on the other side of the versus, as in the case of Green
v. Safir, 0 7 or the power the official seeks to enforce is one that is
"necessarily implied" from the powers of the office.30 8 Even in those
circumstances, the other officials must search for counsel willing to take
the case pro bono, until such time as the court ultimately orders the City
to pay attorneys' fees;309 any firm that takes on the mayor takes a big risk
by lining up with a government office like the public advocate's against the
enormous power of the mayor. 1 0
None of these three structural problems is difficult to remedy. The
Charter Revision Commission's concern about placing subpoena power in
one individual can easily be addressed by authorizing the public advocate
to seek prior judicial approval for a subpoena. This could be done through
a Charter amendment that either adds the necessary requirements to section
1109, which grants the public advocate the power to seek a judicial

378 (1983). The public advocate was not able to rely on the assistance of the corporation
counsel to notify the Taxi and Limousine Commission ("TLC") of its error. After a very
long delay, the TLC impliedly conceded that it could not keep the proceeding secret and
produced the tape of the hearing to the public advocate.
305. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 17 § 394(a) (1989), states: "Except as otherwise
provided in this chapter or other law, the corporation counsel shall be attorney and counsel
for the city and every agency thereof and shall have charge and conduct of all the law
business of the city andits agencies and in which the city is interested." (emphasis added).

306. Id.
307. 664 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1997); see also supra note 70 and
accompanying text.
308. See Hevesi v. Pataki, 643 N.Y.S.2d 895, 899 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1996)
(holding that the comptroller's right to go to court to enforce a settlement between the City
and the State was "'necessarily implied' by his power to agree to the settlement in the first
place").
309. See, e.g., Lamberti v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 565 N.Y.S.2d 111 (App.
Div. 1991). The appellate court ordered fees to the public advocate's lawyers in Green v.
Safir, 664 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1997), aff'd as modified, 679 N.Y.S.2d
383 (App. Div. 1998), relying on Lamberti.
310. A number of potential pro bono counsel have stated off-the-record that they or
various partners in their firms were not willing to take a case where the mayor is on the
other side for fear of loss of favor or business in other matters. C. David Firestone,
Giuliani Backs Aide lWo Asked Firms to Shun Watchdog, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 20 1997, at
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"summary inquiry," 31' or by a provision that authorizes the public advocate
to seek a judicial subpoena under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules
section 2302.312
With regard to the public advocate's funding, a solution is also
obvious. Charter section 259 pegs the budget of the Independent Budget
Office at ten percent of the executive branch's Office of Management and
Budget, thus permitting the IBO to issue independent analyses without fear
of fiscal reprisal. The Public Advocate's Office should similarly have a
budget that is a specified percentage of another agency, perhaps the
Mayor's Office.
Finally, the right to independent legal advice is as essential to good
government as it is to citizenship. In our view, the Charter should be
amended to require the City Council's advice and consent for a position as
essential and powerful as Corporation Counsel and to expressly mandate
that this official serve all City elected officials with equal independence and
objectivity.31 3
CONCLUSION

At some point in the next year, or the next decade, a new charter
revision commission may consider, once again, the allocation of powers in
New York City's government. No doubt, the questions addressed by the
1975, 1989, and 1998 Charter Revision Commissions will be revisited:
Does the Office of Public Advocate make institutional sense? Does it serve
an important and useful function in the City's governance?
We submit that the answer to both questions is "yes." The office
continues to meet its historic function of being a counterweight to-and a
watchdog over-the mayor. Through the groundbreaking efforts of
O'Dwyer, and the expansion by Bellamy, Stein, and Green of the

311. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
312. During the 1989 Charter Revision Commission proceedings, Commissioner
Bernard Richland argued that the public advocate was already authorized to issue a
subpoena under the Civil Practice Law and Rules, since section 2302(a) permits issuance

of a subpoena without court order by "any member of a board, commission or committee
authorized by law to hear, try or determine a matter or to do any other act, in al official
capacity, in relationto which proofmay be taken or the attendance ofa person as a witness

may be required."

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2302(a) (McKinney 1995) (emphasis added).

Richland argued that the public advocate's authority to hold hearings necessarily implied his
right to issue subpoenas. The Commission never addressed the issue further. Without
going that far, the Charter arguably could be amended to expressly state that the public
advocate is authorized to get prior approval of a court before invoking that authority.
313. See also William Josephson & Russell Pearce, To Whom Does the Government
Lawyer Owe the Duty of Loyalty When ClientsAre in Conflict?, 29 How. L.J. 539 (1986).
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individual grievance-handling to include broad research, investigation, and
oversight of the City bureaucracy, the office has truly evolved into a
"people's advocate." The cost of sustaining the public advocate- a
minuscule $2.4 million of the $34 billion New York City budget (or thirty
cents per person per year)-is a very small price to pay for the office's role
in maintaining a more open, accountable, and efficient government in New
York City.
As a city already sixty percent "minority" becomes more racially and
ethnically diverse, there will likely be a backlash against any attempt to
eliminate a citywide office that, as the Charter drafters intended, could be
a rung on the ladder of government power for a minority candidate.
Thus, because of its long history, its cost-benefit ratio, its obvious
record of accomplishments, and its appeal to citywide minority aspirants,
the only elected ombudsman in the United States will and should endure as
an institutional and political presence in New York City for generations to
come.

